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ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL MORTGAGE REFORM 
JACOB WERRETT 
 
Recent economic fallout has revealed that the United States mortgage 
industry needs reform.  Unlike other similar industries, the mortgage 
lending industry lacked fundamental safeguards such as centralized 
regulation, adequate capital reserves, sufficient insurance backstops, and 
strict federal oversight.  As a result, loose lending spawned reckless buying 
which, in turn, led to financial disaster.  In the wake of catastrophe, the 
federal government intervened; regardless of whether federal intervention 
was necessary to prevent systemic calamity, the solution was insufficient to 
create long-term stability and exposed the economy to moral hazard.  This 
Note explains what happened in the mortgage industry, how it affected the 
national economy, and what solution can be deployed to help avoid 
systemic risk in the future. 
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ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL MORTGAGE REFORM 
JACOB WERRETT* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States has plummeted headlong into a financial bugaboo.  
For nearly a year, the media has labored to fix blame on top executives, 
bogus investment vehicles, inflated stock markets, and irresponsible 
investing.  Contrary to the popular media, the core problem may not be the 
result of the typical age-old scapegoats.  In 2008, financial trouble may 
have spawned primarily from one core problem—a broken mortgage 
lending legal system.  This Note asserts that the United States’ financial 
crisis is a result of our having relied on an out-of-date mortgage lending 
system created nearly a century ago—an entirely ancient system in light of 
today’s intricate primary market mortgage products and risk-exposed 
secondary mortgage market products.1 
The mortgage lending industry lacks fundamental industry safeguards, 
such as centralized regulation, adequate capital reserves, an insurance 
backstop, and strict federal oversight.  As a result, the last decade has 
brought irresponsible lending, uninformed buying, careless underwriting, 
negligent securitization of mortgage loans (collateralized debt obligations), 
and reckless insurance of those securitizations (credit default swaps).2  
With all of the financial trouble, even some staunch supporters of 
deregulation have diverged from strict federalist doctrines to concede that 
something should be done.3 
As a result, this Note suggests several possible solutions to the 
                                                                                                                          
* University of Utah, B.A.; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D., candidate 2010.  Jacob 
Werrett is a partner and former principal broker of Thornton Walker, Inc., a real estate brokerage in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
1 ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE 507 (2008) (“Large losses suffered on securitized 
American subprime mortgages triggered the crisis, of course . . . .”); Henry Paulson, Fighting the 
Financial Crisis, One Challenge at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2008, at A1 (“I have always said that 
the decline in the housing market is at the root of the economic downturn and our financial market 
stress.  And the economy, as it slows further, threatens to prolong this decline, as well as the stress on 
our financial institutions and financial markets.”). 
2 The media’s coverage of credit default swaps has focused primarily on the negligent use of 
swaps by banks as capital, the improper rating of swaps by rating agencies, and the careless issuance of 
swaps by insurance entities without retaining adequate reserves.  Matthew Philips, The Monster that 
Ate Wall Street, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 2008, at 46.  While this Note neglects a full discussion of the 
mainstream credit default swap issues, it is still important to note that a more stable mortgage and real 
estate market would have prevented a full-blown meltdown of both the nation’s collateralized debt 
obligations and credit default swaps—regardless of whether the products were sound or not.  Id.; 
Paulson, supra note 1. 
3 Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at 
B1. 
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financial meltdown.  Part II explains why the most effective way to address 
the nation’s financial problem is to pursue reform in the mortgage lending 
industry.  That section also describes how irresponsible mortgage lending 
and borrowing led the economy into the recent financial crisis and asserts 
that inadequate capital reserves, insufficient regulation, unsatisfactory 
secondary mortgage market accountability, and unacceptable mortgage-
backed securitization all contributed to create the perfect financial storm. 
Part III provides a framework for discussing viable solutions to the 
problem.  An effective long-term financial solution must have at least three 
fundamental characteristics to be successful.  First, the solution should be 
focused on mortgage reform.  Second, the solution must be deployed on a 
federal level in order to achieve consistency and immediacy.  And third, 
capital reserves—whether accumulated by institutions, industries, 
government, or insurance—are an essential element of the solution. 
Part IV describes a possible solution to the country’s financial 
problems—a solution that would not create moral hazard or systemic risk, 
as the government’s recent solutions have.  The proposal focuses on 
forming a governmental entity—the Federal Mortgage Insurance 
Corporation (“FMIC”)—to concurrently regulate the mortgage industry 
and provide financial reserves.  This section outlines how the FMIC would 
function, and compares similarly structured entities and industries: the 
Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”), the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (“FDIC”), and the private mortgage insurance industry 
(“PMI”). 
II.  THE PROBLEM 
Beginning with a subprime mortgage lending disaster, which was 
exacerbated by the fall of an irrationally exuberant housing market, the 
United States economy has sunken into one of the worst economic 
recessions in nearly a century.4  The problem grew as a result of a series of 
major missteps that have paralyzed effective solutions moving forward. 
First, the mortgage market began the domino effect.  In retrospect, it is 
clear that the subprime mortgage market posed systemic risk because of 
loose regulation, lack of capital reserves, and lack of proper insurance.5  
Second, to address the problem, the government was forced to act hastily 
in three distinct phases: to avoid recession, to avoid contagion, and to 
avoid depression.  While each of these phases may have been necessary, 
the solutions deployed in each effort fell short of providing proper long-
                                                                                                                          
4 Jon Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis Since ‘30s, With No End Yet in Sight, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 
2008, at A1. 
5 See infra Part II.A.  The above named mortgage problems spawned further disaster by 
exacerbating irresponsible mortgage-backed securitization of risky loans and negligent insuring of 
those securitizations by way of credit default swaps. 
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term solutions.  In fact, each phase of government intervention may have 
actually contributed to future systemic calamity.6  Third, disagreement as 
to how the government should have acted to curb systemic risk flowing 
from the mortgage market handicapped Congress.  In light of convincing 
theories going in entirely different directions—usually based on militant 
partisanship—Congress has done little to stabilize the mortgage market 
through requirements of responsible lending, responsible reporting, 
responsible insurance, and proper hedging against industry risk.7 
A.  How the Mortgage Market Caused Systemic Calamity in 2008 
It is difficult to say exactly when and how the United States’ current 
financial problem began.  Rather than a specific instance, the financial 
crisis came as a result of multiple events and factors.  While much of the 
collateral damage in 2008 and early 2009 surfaced outside the spectrum of 
mortgage lending, there is little doubt that mortgages were among the most 
fundamental causes. 
The first problem in the mortgage industry was insufficient regulation 
of risky loan products.  During the 1980s, rates were high—as much as 
fifteen percent—and few could afford to buy a home.8  In an effort to make 
loans more affordable, lenders began pushing adjustable rate mortgages 
(“ARMs”).9  These loans allowed buyers to contract for the home they 
wanted, find alternative funding, and get out before the “bad loan” began 
to ratchet up and cost more per month than the borrower could afford.  In 
the 1990s, rates came down, and lenders continued to offer alternative 
lending packages, including no money down loans, subprime ARMs, and 
interest only loans.10  During the next decade, these creative financing 
options became more and more popular and increasingly accessible.  
Consumer interest in “creative financing” was fueled significantly by the 
real estate boom that occurred between 2001 and 2008.  By 2006, the 
National Association of Realtors (“NAR”) reported that an astonishing 
forty-three percent of all first time home loans originated that year were 
interest only loans.11 
Aggravating the problem, the twenty-first century ushered in a 
                                                                                                                          
6 See infra Part II.B. 
7 See infra Part II.C. 
8 See ERATE Historical Mortgage Rates, http://www.erate.com/mortgage_rates_history.htm. 
9 See Diana G. Browne, The Development and Practical Application of the Adjustable Rate 
Mortgage Loan: The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation’s Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan 
Purchase Program and Mortgage Loan Instruments, 47 MO. L. REV. 179, 180 (1982); see also Ryan 
Barnes, The Fuel that Fed the Subprime Meltdown, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
articles/07/subprime-overview.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).  
10 See Liz Moyer, Beware Interest-Only, FORBES, Dec. 7, 2005, http://www.forbes.com/services/ 
2005/12/06/interest-only-mortgages-cx_lm_1207mortgage.html. 
11 Noelle Knox, 43% of First Time Home Buyers Put No Money Down, USA TODAY, Jan. 18, 
2006, at 1A. 
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multitude of creative ways to get into a home with no money down.  This 
allowed borrowers to purchase homes with virtually no personal risk of 
loss.  Some critics blamed politicians and political agendas for muddying 
the water by supporting risky lending—either by deregulation, at one end 
of the spectrum, or by pushing financial equality at the other.  In any case, 
many companies, and even the federal government, made efforts to lower 
lending standards and aggressively worked to “help[] families realize the 
American Dream of homeownership.”12  The FHA even extended loans to 
first-time homebuyers with no money down through seller-funded 
downpayment programs.13  Other lenders allowed buyers to obtain an 80% 
loan from one lender and a 20% loan from another, thus allowing 100% 
financing.14  Still other lenders provided one hundred percent financing 
with a requirement to purchase private mortgage insurance to cover twenty 
percent of the loan.15  Under these “no equity” scenarios, half of the 
nation’s buyers were a short-downturn-in-the-market away from owing 
more on their homes than the home was worth.  And that is just what 
happened.  The result, by mid 2008, was that a greater percentage of 
people were upside down in their mortgages than during any time in 
history since the Great Depression.16  And, with so many homeowners with 
little-to-no money invested into their homes (as a result of no money down 
mortgage lending) and zero to negative equity positions, foreclosures 
jumped dramatically. 
Second, the mortgage securities market exacerbated the problem by 
encouraging subprime lending and even discouraging prime lending.  In 
the 1930s the government created Fannie Mae to help fund the primary 
mortgage market.17  Eventually this entity became a government-sponsored 
entity (“GSE”).  Fannie provided a market for the sale of mortgagor 
obligations, which provided more capital to the primary market.  The 
positive result was that more money flowing into the secondary market 
provided more money in the primary market—resulting in more home 
loans.  This revolution in mortgages, created by the inception of a bona 
fide secondary market, provided a way to finance more mortgages and 
therefore begin the steep climb out of the financial dregs of the Great 
                                                                                                                          
12 Alphonso Jackson, Remarks at Access Across America Economic Empowerment Summit (Oct. 
14, 2004), available at www.hud.gov/news/speeches/2004-10-14.cfm. 
13 See Federal Housing Administration, Neighborhood Gold Down Payment Assistance, 
http://www.fha-home-loans.com/neighborhood_gold_down_payment_assistance_program.htm 
(providing that the Gold Account is a type of escrow account/vehicle allowing the seller to contribute 
to the buyer’s downpayment in a real estate closing). 
14 Dave Ramsey, Is an 80/20 Mortgage a Good Idea?, WORLDNETDAILY, Apr. 20, 2005, 
http://www.wnd.com/index.php?pageId=29928. 
15 Id. 
16 Edmund L. Andrews & Louis Uchitelle, Rescues for Homeowners in Debt Weighed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2008, at A1. 
17 About Fannie Mae, http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/charter.jhtml (last visited Sept. 13, 
2009). 
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Depression.  When the secondary market needed more capital to buy loans 
from the primary market it would bundle the loans and sell mortgagor-
payment-rights to investors.  This securitization process by Fannie and 
other GSEs is known as mortgage-backed securitization.18  The key to 
understanding why securitization corrupted the entire mortgage system is 
recognizing that the flow of money into the mortgage industry is based 
upon securitization.  These pools of securitized loans include both prime 
and subprime loans.  To increase investor interest in subprime loans, many 
Wall Street companies preferred that primary lenders gather less borrower 
documentation, making the borrower’s profile more opaque and thus more 
attractive.19  This provided primary market lenders with incentive to sell 
loans without mortgagor documentation—called “no doc loans” 
(applications lacking tax returns, income statements, bank statements, 
etc).20  Thus, loose mortgage securitization standards spawned loose 
mortgage lending practices, which opened the door for fraud and 
irresponsible lending and borrowing.21 
Third, a housing bubble developed as a result of low interest rates and 
low threshold loans.  These two factors had been important barriers that 
kept real estate purchases down.  With both barriers to entry eliminated, 
homebuyers rushed to take advantage of low interest rates set by the 
Federal Reserve (the “Fed”) and for the first time ever subprime buyers 
were able to join the buying frenzy with little or no money down.  The 
bubble became a problem when irrational exuberance deflated and prices 
subsequently declined.22 
Normally when a person loses their job, or their adjustable rate 
mortgage adjusts and makes the loan too expensive, the owner can just sell 
                                                                                                                          
18 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Mortgage-Backed Securities, http://www.sec.gov/ 
answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2009). 
Mortgage backed securities (MBS) are debt obligations that represent claims to 
the cash flows from pools of mortgage loans, most commonly on residential 
property.  Mortgage loans are purchased from banks, mortgage companies, and other 
originators and then assembled into pools by a governmental, quasi-governmental, 
or private entity.  The entity then issues securities that represent claims on the 
principal and interest payments made by borrowers on the loans in the pool, a 
process known as securitization.  Most MBSs are issued by the Government 
National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), a U.S. government agency, or the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), U.S. government sponsored Enterprises. 
Id. 
19 Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of 
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2048–49 (2007). 
20 Id. 
21 See id. at 2049 (discussing the securitization of mortgage loans and the connection with 
subprime lending); ROBERT SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS HAPPENED AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1–10 (2008) (“The stage was perfectly set for 
unscrupulous mortgage originators to lend to low income people who were likely to default, and for 
mortgage securitizers to sell the soon-to-default mortgages off to unsuspecting investors.”). 
22 See SHILLER, SUBPRIME SOLUTION, supra note 21, at 1–10. 
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their home.  But, after the housing market boomed and then subsequently 
deflated, many owners owed the bank more for their home than the market 
was willing to pay.  As a result, a person whose life circumstances required 
them to sell their home was forced to either pay the difference (often an 
impossible proposition for an already financially distressed seller) or stop 
making full payments and take steps toward inevitable foreclosure.  A 
report in late 2008 found that among persons who purchased homes 
between 2003 and 2008, 29% owed more on their home than the home was 
worth.23  Approximately twelve million homeowners faced a serious risk of 
foreclosure by late 2008, representing nearly sixteen percent of all 
homeowners in the country.24  And, in 2008, foreclosure filings were up 
approximately 81% from 2007 and 225% from 2006.25 
Fourth, the mortgage problem became a disaster because lending 
institutions were undercapitalized, insufficiently insured, and held and 
offered portfolios that were not properly diversified.  There were several 
ways in which the lending institutions failed to hedge against risk:  (1) they 
did not invest in collateral that tends to rise in value when other collateral 
tends to decrease (hedge); (2) they failed to purchase sufficient insurance 
against expansive assets for which they were exposed; (3) they failed to 
develop the necessary reserves to facilitate liquidity in times of crisis; and 
(4) they failed to underwrite conservatively.  Importantly, the cost of 
foreclosure became even greater during the economic downturn, because 
the value of the collateral declined.  In a stable economy, banks can expect 
to lose an average of 29% of the loan amount in the process of foreclosing 
on a house to recoup the collateral funds.26  In 2008 and much of 2009, 
banks were losing approximately 44% of the loan amount, as a result of 
significant market decline.27  Unfortunately, as of late 2008 only about 
10% of the country’s mortgage debt was insured,28 and among insured 
lenders, most are only insured up to 20%.29  This means that the average 
lending institution is exposed to significant risk, and more importantly, in 
                                                                                                                          
23 James R. Hagerty & Ruth Simon, Housing Pain Gauge: Nearly 1 in 6 Owners “Under Water,” 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2008, at A5. 
24 See id. (noting that twelve million homeowners were underwater). 
25 Stephanie Armour, 2008 Foreclosure Fillings Set Record, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 2009, at 1B;  
see also Stephanie Armour, Foreclosures Up: 1 in 84 Homes Affected in First Half of Year, USA 
TODAY, July 16, 2009, at 3B (reporting nearly two million foreclosures during the first six months of 
2009). 
26 Damian Paletta et al., U.S. Steps Up Help for Homeowners, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2008, at A3. 
27 Id. 
28 See discussion infra Part IV.A. (discussing data illustrating that mortgage insurance is primarily 
provided by three entities: the Federal Housing Administration, the Veterans Administration, and the 
private mortgage industry:  Together these three providers of insurance insure approximately $1.5 
trillion in debt.  Comparatively, the nation’s consumers currently have over $13 trillion in outstanding 
mortgage debt.). 
29 MORTGAGE INSURANCE COMPANIES OF AMERICA, 2008–2009 FACT BOOK & MEMBER 
DIRECTORY 6 (2008–09) [hereinafter MICA FACTBOOK] (discussing that private mortgage insurance 
companies generally cover twenty percent). 
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an era where companies are “too big to fail,” this problem puts the entire 
economic system at risk. 
Thus, in the wake of mortgage catastrophe, the government was forced 
to seize and bail out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—mammoth secondary 
market mortgage holders—by dedicating two hundred billion dollars of 
taxpayers’ money.30  Only a few weeks later, Congress voted to allow the 
Treasury to bail out banks and other financial intermediaries linked 
indirectly to the mortgage market by passing a bill to inject seven hundred 
billion dollars into the economy.31  The Secretary of the Treasury, Henry 
Paulson, stated that he, too, believed the mortgage lending institutions and 
the products they sold were at the root of the financial crisis:  “The 
underlying weakness in our financial system today is the illiquid mortgage 
assets that have lost value as the housing correction has proceeded. . . . As 
we all know, lax lending practices earlier this decade led to irresponsible 
lending and irresponsible borrowing.”32 
B.  Why Recent Government Action Has Not Provided a Viable Solution 
Another significant part of the 2008 financial problem was that the 
government reacted, as opposed to acted, and was forced to do so hastily, 
as opposed to thoughtfully.  The government’s overall “plan” emerged in 
three distinct phases: (1) to stop recession; (2) to stop contagion; and (3) to 
avoid depression.  Each of these steps was defensive—as opposed to 
offensive—and was prompted by plans to stop the financial crisis from 
spreading.  While these phases have been somewhat effective, government 
intervention has failed to address the crux of the financial problem—the 
need for meaningful reform in the mortgage industry.  The government’s 
actions within each of these phases of government intervention has 
provided a short term solution for a long-term problem.  More specifically, 
                                                                                                                          
30 Pedro Nicolaci Da Costa, Fannie, Freddie Bailout Greeted with Cautious Optimism, REUTERS, 
Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN0527106320080909. 
31 Alan S. Blinder, Got $700 Billion? Sweat the Details, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, at BU1. 
32 Henry Paulson, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks at the Press Room, Sept. 19, 2008, 
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1149.htm.  Paulson continued: 
What began as a subprime lending problem has spread to other, less-risky 
mortgages, and contributed to excess home inventories that have pushed down home 
prices for responsible homeowners. 
A similar scenario is playing out among the lenders who made those mortgages, 
the securitizers who bought, repackaged and resold them, and the investors who 
bought them.  These troubled loans are now parked, or frozen, on the balance sheets 
of banks and other financial institutions, preventing them from financing productive 
loans.  The inability to determine their worth has fostered uncertainty about 
mortgage assets, and even about the financial condition of the institutions that own 
them.  The normal buying and selling of nearly all types of mortgage assets has 
become challenged. 
These illiquid assets are clogging up our financial system, and undermining the 
strength of our otherwise sound financial institutions. 
Id. 
 328 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:319 
each government initiative has failed to provide protection against future 
systemic financial failure, and in some instances, government action has 
actually increased market exposure to systemic calamity. 
1.  Avoid Recession 
First, in order to slow recession, the Fed cut interest rates for several 
consecutive months until it finally reached one percent on October 29, 
2008.33  That ultra-low rate represented the lowest rate––and as such was 
arguably the most drastic Fed action––since Dwight Eisenhower was 
president.34  Ever since the stock market crash of 1929, the Fed has been 
under significant pressure to lift rates when the country’s finances 
tighten.35  The theory is that after an economic bubble bursts, or after a 
major catastrophe (like the recent precipitous decline of housing prices and 
simultaneous spike in foreclosures), the market slows because investors are 
hesitant to inject capital into a risky economy—effectively declining to 
throw good money after bad and banks horde money in order to shore up 
capital reserves.  The result causes a negative feedback loop that ultimately 
leads to recession.  Investor caution results in less capital in the secondary 
mortgage market, which leads to less capital in the primary mortgage 
market.  This chain reaction creates an increasingly difficult financial 
environment for homebuyers to qualify for loans.  If qualifying for a home 
loan becomes increasingly difficult, then there is less demand for homes in 
the market; this results in less building of homes and prices are then 
lowered to compete against the increase of homes for sale (high supply, 
low demand).  This process causes builders and construction workers to 
lose jobs, which results in an economy with even fewer buyers.  Thus, the 
whole system is cyclical.  So, when the Fed lowers interest rates it allows 
banks to more easily borrow funds from the Fed’s discount window or 
through the Federal Reserve Fund, and the process injects capital into the 
slowing economy to stop the negative feedback loop. 
But, when the Fed is forced to lower interest rates considerably, it 
                                                                                                                          
33 Mark Thomas, Fed Cuts Target Rate to One Percent, ECON. VIEW, Oct. 29, 2008, 
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2008/10/fed-cuts-target.html (“The pace of 
economic activity appears to have slowed markedly, owing importantly to a decline in consumer 
expenditures.  Business equipment spending and industrial production have weakened in recent 
months, and slowing economic activity in many foreign economies is damping the prospects for U.S. 
exports.  Moreover, the intensification of financial market turmoil is likely to exert additional restraint 
on spending, partly by further reducing the ability of households and businesses to obtain credit.”). 
34 Rupert Cornwall, Half Point Cut Takes U.S. Into Interest Rates Lowest Level Since Eisenhower, 
INDEP. BUS., Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/halfpoint-cut-takes-us-
interest-rates-to-lowest-level-since-eisenhower-era-616173.html. 
35 MILTON FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 79–83 (1980) (“The stock market crash was important, 
but it was not the beginning of the depression . . . . These depressing effects of the stock market crash 
were strongly reinforced by the subsequent behavior of the Federal Reserve System . . . . [T]he fed’s 
actions were hesitant and small.  In the main, it stood idly by and let the crisis take its course—a pattern 
of behavior that was to be repeated again and again during the next two years.”). 
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exposes the economic system to risk, because it is one of the most effective 
means for fighting recession—and once it is used, it is used.  This concept 
led Alan Greenspan to refer to raising interest rates in anticipation of 
economic trouble as building “a bit of insurance”36—that is, by raising 
interest rates, the Fed is able to prepare the effectiveness of its weapon for 
use in times of economic trouble.  Supporting this theory, others have 
warned, “the Fed probably would want to stop short of zero, so it saves its 
precious ammunition.”37  With the rates already at record lows during 2008 
and 2009, the Fed’s strongest tool for jumpstarting the economy was 
exhausted.  In sum, the Fed correctly lowered interest rates to avoid 
recession, but the U.S. economic system would be less volatile and would 
be exposed to less risk if this action was not the first measure taken (or the 
first measure available)—since it may also be the last hope. 
In the past, we have seen that different industries are so massive that 
turbulence within one industry can derail the entire market.  The bank 
panic of 1907 seized the entire economy; the stock market crash of 1929 
set off the Great Depression; the mortgage and housing fallout of 2007 has 
similarly slowed the entire financial system—banks, stocks, lenders, 
builders, and the auto industry have all begun to fail as a result.38  For this 
reason, systemic risk is best restrained by establishing capital reserves, 
insurance, and financial safeguards within each individual market within 
an economy.  By stabilizing individual companies, industries, and markets 
we can ensure that entire economies do not totally collapse and set off 
nationwide financial failure.  Serially cutting interest rates—effectively 
giving out free government loans—only precipitates irresponsible lending 
and leaves the economy exposed to greater risk. 
2.  Avoid Contagion 
The second phase of government action was to avoid contagion.  As 
the financial crisis continued, the government was forced to take additional 
action to contain the deterioration of the financial markets, due to a few 
bad assets and failing companies.  Many companies in dire straits were 
considered by the government to be “too big to fail”—that is, companies 
that were so big that bankruptcy would cause a domino effect and slow or 
stop the entire economy.  This concept of too big to fail did not originate 
                                                                                                                          
36 GREENSPAN, supra note 1, at 201–02. 
37 Jeannine Aversa, How Low Can the Fed Go On Interest Rates?, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Oct. 29, 
2008, http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20081029/analysis-how-low-can-fed-go-on-interest-rates.htm. 
38 GREENSPAN, supra note 1, at 513 (“Why for the first time in eight decades, did banks and the 
securities markets get hit hard simultaneously?  The answer appears to be that both now draw 
increasingly on the same sources of funds.  For much of the twentieth century, savers’ deposits, largely 
insured by the federal government, were the main source of funding for banks, while securities firms 
relied on investors for their short-term funds.  Savers are legendarily “passive”—for instance, in the 
late 1970s, even as interest rates on safe, short-term investments climbed into double digits, many bank 
customers doggedly kept their money in fixed rate 5.5 percent passbook accounts.”). 
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with the 2008 financial crisis; rather, it was introduced during the Dot Com 
Era.  In 1998, one of Wall Street’s largest and most successful hedge 
funds—Long Term Capital Management (“LTCM”)—was saved by the 
Fed because it was seen by many as too big to fail: 
[The New York Fed] literally gathered top officials of sixteen 
of the world’s most powerful banks and investment houses in 
a room; suggested strongly that if they fully comprehended 
the losses they would face in a forced fire sale of LTCM’s 
assets they would work it out; and left.  After days of 
increasingly tense negotiations, the bankers came up with an 
infusion of $3.5 billion for LTCM.39 
This injection of money under the direction of the Fed gave LTCM enough 
capital to sell off its assets in an orderly way and close its doors without 
causing systemic calamity.  The New York Times announced the Fed’s 
intervention on the front page:  “Seeing a Fund as Too Big to Fail, New 
York Fed Assists Its Bailout.”40 
Early in 2008, Bear Stearns began to show signs of financial 
instability.  After fully considering the size of Bear Stearns and its 
influence on the market, the Treasury Secretary began attempts to broker a 
shotgun marriage with another large intermediary.41  With some work, JP 
Morgan Chase offered to purchase the failing institution, but only after the 
government contributed an extra twenty-nine billion dollars to make the 
merger work.42 
In the wake of the Bear Stearns bailout, the government elected to 
provide taxpayer support for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.43  The 
                                                                                                                          
39 Id. at 195. 
40 Gretchen Morgenson, The Markets; Seeing a Fund as Too Big To Fail, New York Fed Assists 
Its Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1998, at A1.  Indeed, the Times article described the Fed’s action: 
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York has helped organize the rescue of a large 
and prominent speculative fund, indicating that regulators recognize that the failure 
of such a fund would damage already fragile world markets.  Under an agreement 
reached late yesterday, the fund, Long-Term Capital Management L.P. of 
Greenwich, Conn., received a cash infusion of more than $3.5 billion from a 
consortium of commercial banks and investment firms.  The fund, whose founder is 
John Meriwether, a former vice chairman of Salomon Inc., and whose partners 
included two Nobel prize winners, is said to be have a portfolio worth $90 billion.  
The deal came after representatives of 16 banks and brokerage houses met at the 
offices of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in downtown Manhattan.  It is 
extremely unusual for the Federal Reserve to get involved in the bailout of such a 
fund, known as a hedge fund, a virtually unregulated type of investment firm, which 
despite its name, speculates in high-risk trades in markets around the world. 
Id. 
41 Kate Kelly, Bear Stearns Neared Collapse Twice in Frenzied Last Week, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 
2008, at A1. 
42 Landon Thomas, Jr. & Eric Dash, Seeking Fast Deal, JP Morgan Quintuples Bear Stearns Bid, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2008, at C1. 
43 Zachary A. Goldfarb et al., Treasury to Rescue Fannie and Freddie: Regulators Seek to Keep 
Firms’ Troubles From Setting Off Wave of Bank Failures, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2008, at A01. 
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government seized and supported the two entities—with the use of 
taxpayer dollars—when their books began to show a catastrophic financial 
future.44  The government effectively placed Freddie and Fannie into 
“conservatorship”—a euphemism for declaring bankruptcy—and provided 
a government bailout.45 
During just one year, the government has committed hundreds of 
billions of dollars to bailing out dozens of companies: (1) $45 billion to the 
Bank of America; (2) $50 billion to Citigroup; (3) $70 billion to AIG; (4) 
$85 billion to the auto industry—General Motors and Chrysler; (5) $7 
billion to GMAC bank; (6) $25 billion to JP Morgan Chase; and (7) $25 
billion to Wells Fargo.46 
The problem with the steps the government has taken to stop contagion 
is that it has effectively made institutions that are “too big to fail,” bigger.  
In the case of Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and American Express, the 
government has allowed these entities access to the Fed’s discount window 
without requiring compliance to the stricter bank holding company 
standards, for two years—maybe more.47  Without the government’s 
money giveaway and money-sweetened merger techniques, these entities 
would likely have been split up and sold, resulting in fewer “too big to 
fail” companies.  Ultimately, propping up mammoth institutions on the 
brink of tumbling into smaller institutions may only put off and increase 
the damage of an inevitable financial cataclysm. 
3.  Avoid Depression 
During the latest phase, the government acted to avoid depression.48  
Accordingly, the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Paulson, presented a 
seven hundred billion dollar bailout plan for American corporations.49  
With an increasing number of too big to fail companies failing, the 
Treasury and Fed created a plan that would allow federal funds to be 
allocated largely at Paulson’s discretion and primarily as funds for bailouts 
                                                                                                                          
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Matt Erickson et al., Tracking the 700 Billion Dollar Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2009, 
http://projects.nytimes.com/creditcrisis/recipients/table. 
47 Kristin Jones, Why is Everyone Becoming a Bank Holding Company?, PROPUBLICA, Nov. 12, 
2008, http://www.propublica.org/article/why-is-everyone-becoming-a-bank-holding-company-1112 
(“The Fed has said that the companies have two years to comply with the stricter regulations on bank 
holding companies, and it will allow extensions of a year at a time.”). 
48 In some respects these “phases” overlapped and could be seen as one grand effort to avoid 
depression.  Although, as the economy worsened and contagion inevitably spread (or threatened to 
spread) Congress became increasingly willing to act aggressively to avoid widespread economic 
depression—as displayed in the final months of 2008.  
49 Henry Paulson, Text of Draft Proposal for Bail Out Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/21draftcnd.html. 
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and to purchase troubled assets.50  Secretary Paulson and Fed Chairman 
Bernanke both testified in front of Congress to garner support for the 
bailout strategy.  They proposed several arguments to garner support for 
the plan, including that: it would stabilize the economy, it would improve 
liquidity, it would provide a comprehensive strategy, it would bring 
immediate action, it would have a broad impact, and it would stimulate 
investor confidence.51 
Another course of action taken by the government to avoid depression 
was to inject capital into the market through the country’s largest banks.52  
On October 13, the chief executives of the country’s nine largest banks 
filed into a conference room where Secretary Paulson told them all that the 
government was forcing them to accept government share purchases.53  
The nine banks included Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, 
Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Bank of New 
York Mellon, and State Street.54 
The problem with the government’s final course of action was that for 
decades owners of private corporations have enjoyed significant profits 
and the public has not shared in those profits.  Now, in an effort to avoid 
depression, the Fed and Treasury were acting as insurers and socializing 
the losses of the country’s largest institutions.  If the government is 
proving that these institutions need insurance, then it makes sense that they 
should be properly insured—and more importantly that the premiums 
should be paid by the institutions, not taxpayers.  Privatizing profits and 
socializing losses creates moral hazard.55 
To date, the government has failed to attach proper requirements (like 
requiring future insurance or significantly increased capital requirements) 
upon those institutions that are receiving handouts.  This “government 
insurance” in the form of a “bailout plan” without a requirement that the 
institutions commit to an industry insurance in the future, exposes the 
nation to rampant moral hazard and ultimately to increased systemic risk. 
                                                                                                                          
50 Daniel Gross, How the Bail Out is Like a Hedge Fund, SLATE, Oct. 1, 2008, http://www.slate. 
com/id/2201340/. 
51 Ben Bernanke, Address Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
(Sept. 23, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1153.htm. 
52 Mark Landler & Eric Dash, Drama Behind a Banking Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2008, at A1. 
53 Id. 
54 Id.; Deborah Solomon et al., U.S. to Buy Stakes in Nation’s Largest Banks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
14, 2008, at A1. 
55 Daniel Henninger, Welcome to ‘Moral Hazard’, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2008, at A17 (“‘Moral 
hazard’ dates back hundreds of years in obscurity, but its use eventually settled inside the insurance 
business in the 19th century.  The French call it risque moral.  Back then, it really was taken to mean 
that reducing risk too much exposed people to the hazard of poor moral judgments.  If an insurer 
charged too little for a policy to replace farms in the English countryside, Farmer Brown might be less 
careful about cows knocking over oil lamps in the barn.”). 
 2009] ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL MORTGAGE REFORM 333 
C.  Finding the Middle Ground for Dealing with Systemic Risk 
Another hurdle to hedging against systemic risk by reforming 
mortgage law is dealing with the polarized opinion about how to deal with 
systemic risk.  It is true that fundamentally dissimilar perspectives will 
usually balance our federal economic agenda, but diametrically opposed 
ideals can significantly retard the progress of efficient and helpful industry 
reform. 
1.  One View: It Is Not Congress’s Job to Govern Mortgage Reform 
Generally speaking, conservative thinkers want the government to 
shrink and impose less regulation.  This perspective is rooted in the idea 
that the free market will provide its own oversight and that investors will 
look out for themselves and protect their assets as long as government does 
not take away critical hedging tools.  From this federalist perspective, it is 
not the central government’s job to quell systemic risk.  Rather, it is the 
federal government’s job to protect the citizen’s right to invest, buy, and 
sell.  Promoters of this school of thought agree that the very act of financial 
self-protection, by everyone in a free market, provides the optimum 
safeguard against systemic calamity.56 
Defenders of conservative free market thinking assert that the recent 
mortgage meltdown was exacerbated by market-meddling-liberals who 
required low income financing and rallied around concepts of “housing for 
everyone”—even those who could not afford a home.57  One of the most 
prominent and ardent supporters of the free market correction theory is—
or, rather, was—Alan Greenspan, who preached deregulation for decades 
while he labored as Federal Reserve Chairman.  While he acknowledged 
that markets could become inflated and instable, he also believed that 
investors interested in preserving their own cash would protect 
themselves—and thus protect the economy.  Contributing to free market 
thinking, many economists believe that “markets have become too 
complex for effective human intervention,” and “the most promising anti-
crisis policies are those that maintain maximum market flexibility.”58 
Thus, in light of possible mortgage reform, conservative thinking 
warns that Congress’s meddling with regulation and market constraints 
would potentially superficially kink and clog market efficiencies, which in 
                                                                                                                          
56 GREENSPAN, supra note 1, at 489, 523.  
57 The Mortgage Lender, Implode-O-Meter, http://ml-implode.com/sfdpacampaign.html (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2009) (rallying opposition to a recent congressional efforts to lower thresholds for 
consumers in the housing market).  
58 GREENSPAN, supra note 1, at 489, 523 (“[Governments and Central banks are] unable to 
effectively thwart the waves of speculation, the best strategy is to ensure that our markets at all times 
have enough flexibility and resilience, unencumbered by protectionism or rigid regulation, to absorb 
and mitigate the shock of crisis.”). 
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turn would expose the economy to greater systemic risk.59  Additionally, in 
an increasingly complex and fast-paced marketplace, free marketers may 
assert that that government intervention—in an industry like mortgage 
lending—would only slow production and provide no real ability to 
anticipate or quell systemic risk.60 
2.  Another View: It Is Congress’s Job to Head Mortgage Reform 
On the other hand, liberal thinkers assert that the financial crisis of 
2008 is a verdict against the failed policies of the Bush administration and 
the conservative ideals of deregulation.61  Supporters of this school of 
thought are persuaded that the federal government should intervene and be 
an active regulator of markets in order to safeguard against systemic risk.  
Additionally, liberal thinkers believe that necessary regulations extend to 
health care, job security, and ultimately wealth distribution—balances that 
keep the free market from imploding.  Under this line of thinking, 
mortgage regulation should be centralized and be conducted by the federal 
government. 
Prominent Yale scholar Robert Shiller asserted that market exuberance 
should be dealt with by (1) influence, (2) statute, and (3) ongoing 
regulation.  Shiller asserted that economic bubbles are the result of 
investment ignorance, fueling media influences, and conflicts of interest.62  
In his book Irrational Exuberance, he suggested that economic experts, 
government authorities, and trusted leaders of our country, have the 
responsibility of blowing the whistle on inflated prices and dangerous 
                                                                                                                          
59 Dorit Samuel, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Will New Regulations Help Avoid Future 
Financial Debacles?, 2 ALB. GOV. L. REV. 217, 255 (2009) (“In general, it is the free markets, 
unencumbered by regulations, that are more creative and experience the fastest growth. . . . A heavily 
regulated market might have lower volatility, but it is also more cumbersome and slow in developing 
new and creative financial products that stimulate growth.  The solution to our financial problems is not 
to invest our resources in a new and restrictive system of regulations that is not flexible enough to keep 
pace with a complex, innovative and increasingly global financial world.”); GREENSPAN, supra note 1, 
at 174–75 (“A stock market boom, of course, is an economic plus—it predisposes businesses to 
expand, makes consumers feel flush, and helps the economy to grow. . . . Only when a collapsing 
market might threaten to hamstring the real economy is there cause for people like the Treasury 
Secretary and the Chairman of the Fed to worry. . . . [This] sort of disaster happen[ed] in Japan, where 
the economy was crippled from a stock and real estate collapse in 1990.”). 
60 GREENSPAN, supra note 1, at 490 (“In today’s world, I fail to see how adding more government 
regulation can help.  Collecting data on hedge fund balance sheets, for example, would be                                                                
futile, since the data would probably be obsolete before the ink dried. . . . I have been dealing with 
financial market reports [within private equity funds] for almost six decades.  I would not be able to 
judge from such reports whether concentrations of positions reflected markets in the process of doing 
what they are supposed to do or whether some dangerous trading was emerging.  I would truly be 
surprised if anyone could.”). 
61 Mark Shields, The Verdict is In on Deregulation, LEDGER ENQUIRER, June 6, 2009, 
http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/sunday_voices/story/740725.html; John Gard, Economic Crisis Marks 
Final Verdict on Deregulation Policies Championed, HIGHBEAM, Oct. 3, 2008, 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1569171261.html. 
62 ROBERT SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 203–33 (2000). 
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speculation before they reach systemic proportions.63 
Accordingly, while the country’s real estate prices were overheating 
and the mortgage lending industry was negligently successful, Shiller 
responded in 2008 by writing a book entitled The Subprime Solution: How 
Today’s Global Financial Crisis Happened and What To Do About It.  In 
his book, Shiller called for a complete restructuring of the country’s 
financial systems.64  According to this line of thinking, the mortgage 
lending system overhaul should begin with increased regulation, 
legislation, and oversight. 
3.  The Dilemma: Finding Middle Ground and Moving Forward 
One of the dilemmas that has consistently stagnated mortgage reform 
in the United States is that there are such stark differences in fundamental 
beliefs about how to make the industry more efficient and less volatile.  
These opposing opinions have stalemated mortgage reform for decades.  In 
fact, mortgage reform has been largely unsuccessful and unpopular until 
recent years. 
Part of the genius of a two-party system is that there is usually a 
middle ground that opposing schools of thought can agree upon in order to 
move forward with reform.  Fortunately, with mortgage reform, the 
traditionally narrow middle ground may be temporarily broadening in light 
of the recent catastrophic financial issues now facing the country.  A prime 
example is the fact that some staunch deregulators are gravitating toward 
the middle.65  In early November of 2008, Alan Greenspan testified before 
the House Committee that he had perhaps been wrong to rely on the self-
correcting ability of the free market—particularly in regard to wanton 
mortgage spending.66  When Greenspan was asked if he thought he had 
been wrong about promoting deregulation for nearly two decades, he 
answered by admitting “partially.”67 
Thus, just as in the days of the Great Depression, catastrophe has 
ripened sentiment to pursue significant reform of a system that is obviously 
in great need of it.  Formerly opposing parties are beginning to agree on 
the few fundamental elements of successful mortgage reform: that is to say 
                                                                                                                          
63 Id. 
64 SHILLER, SUBPRIME SOLUTION, supra note 221, at 107–69 (proposing that Congress instigate 
several programs, including (1) a new organization modeled after the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation 
established in 1933; (2) a new information infrastructure (including improved financial disclosure of 
mortgage backed securities); (3) “new markets” to increase real estate liquidity (including a residential 
home-price futures market); and (4) new retail risk management institutions (including home equity 
insurance). 
65 Andrews, supra note 3. 
66 Id. (“Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect 
shareholders’ equity, myself included, are in a state of shocked disbelief . . . . Yes, I’ve found a flaw [in 
my past ideology and logic]. I don’t know how significant or permanent it is.  But I’ve been very 
distressed by that fact.”). 
67 Id. 
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there is widespread agreement that some regulation should be added, that 
capital reserves are absolutely necessary,68 and that insurance is needed to 
protect the taxpayer from being the primary insurer.69  The next step is to 
create an agreeable reformative framework upon which both regulatory 
agendas and deregulatory agendas can agree. 
III.  GUIDELINES FOR A WORKABLE SOLUTION 
Before proposing a solution to the current financial calamity, it is 
helpful to first outline the general characteristics of a plan that would best 
resolve the problems that exist to avoid a similar crisis in the future.  This 
section proposes three basic and general characteristics that represent a 
non-radical middle ground that could be adopted by both deregulators and 
regulators alike. 
A.  The Solution Must Target Mortgage Reform 
As the previous section made clear, many of the country’s financial 
problems stem from loose lending statutes that allowed irresponsible 
lending practices, which precipitated naïve, foolish, or selfish mortgages.  
Lending laws have evolved slowly because mortgage law has been 
primarily a state responsibility.70  Even though the day-to-day oversight of 
mortgage lending has been primarily governed by individual state law, 
during the last half-century Congress has begun to impose a few broad 
restrictions that have served as benchmarks, or industry minimum 
standards.  Unfortunately, these broad federal benchmarks were not 
sufficient to screen fraudulent lending, creative financing, subprime 
lending, and even predatory lending.  It would seem that the federal 
statutory benchmarks must be increased in order to be effective in today’s 
modern economy.  This section briefly outlines each of the major federal 
mortgage lending laws and provides a few reasons for reforming—or at 
least extending—each of these federal benchmarks. 
1.  The Truth in Lending Act 
The Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) was enacted by Congress in 1968 
to achieve greater transparency in lending laws.71  Congress hoped that 
“economic stabilization would be enhanced and the competition among the 
various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of 
consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit.”72  
                                                                                                                          
68 Congress recently conceded the need for capital reserves by accepting Secretary Paulson’s 
radical trillion-dollar plan to bailout Wall Street. 
69 Jonathan Koppell, A Failure Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at A27. 
70 See infra Part III.B.2. 
71 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000). 
72 Id. 
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Since 1968, additional regulations were added to the Act, most notably, 
Regulation Z.73  The main thrust of Regulation Z was to provide increased 
disclosure to assist consumers in deciding between varying types of loans.  
This increased transparency provided increased consumer education and 
made significant steps toward preventing loan fraud.  According to 
Regulation Z, the lender must disclose the federal annual percentage rate 
(“APR”), disclose finance charge requirements, adhere to credit provisions, 
provide rights of rescission, and adhere to stricter advertising schemes.74  
Perhaps the most popular provision is the borrowers right to rescission 
within three days of signing the loan documents—also known as the 
“buyer’s remorse provision.”75 
While TILA has provided many useful foundational guidelines for 
requiring creditors to disclose the costs of credit, it does not sufficiently 
warn borrowers about the intricacies of mortgage financing.76  Admittedly, 
the lending process is complicated and ensuring that mortgagors are fully 
informed would be a daunting task.  However, other industries have begun 
to provide innovative means for informing consumers.  For example, some 
student loans explain terms and obligations by video; other student loans 
teach by testing the loan applicant’s understanding during each segment of 
the educational process.  Less expensive student loan tutorials provide 
reading material accompanied by a similar exam format.  Likewise, TILA 
could be modernized to move from passively disclosing lender information 
to actively teaching the consumer.  A heightened comprehension standard 
imposed by the federal government would lead the mortgage industry to 
take steps toward achieving the increased conventional wisdom that Shiller 
predicted would work to slow irresponsible investing.77 
2.  The Real Estate Settlement Act 
The Real Estate Settlement Act (“RESPA”) was created by Congress 
in order to accomplish two goals: first, to ensure that consumers would be 
provided with “greater and more timely information on the nature and 
costs of the settlement process” and second, to protect consumers from 
unnecessarily high settlement charges caused by “certain abusive 
practices” that had developed all over the country.78  The regulations 
enumerated in RESPA fall under four primary categories: (1) to require 
                                                                                                                          
73 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2009). 
74 Id. 
75 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2000). 
76 Lisa Keyfetz, The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994: Extending Liability for 
Predatory Subprime Loans to Secondary Mortgage Market Participants, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 
151, 173 (2005) (“The statute requires creditors to provide borrowers with standard disclosures 
regarding the costs of credit.  However, TILA was not created to respond to the deceptive and abusive 
practices which developed specifically in the home-equity market.”) 
77 SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 62, at 224–33. 
78 The Real Estate Settlement Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000). 
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disclosure prior to the day of the closing; (2) to eliminate kickbacks and 
referral fees that cross industries and undermine client representation; (3) 
to reduce the escrow amounts required for taxes and insurance; and (4) to 
increase lender recordkeeping to facilitate transparency.79  Among the most 
well-known of the RESPA requirements is that the lender must provide 
each buyer with a previously-prepared government agency booklet.80  
Also, the lender must include a good faith estimate the specific charges the 
borrower is likely to incur should he or she determine that the loan is 
satisfactory.81  The statute also requires that a Uniform Settlement 
Statement (“HUD form”) be provided to “conspicuously and clearly 
itemize all charges imposed upon both the borrower and all charges 
imposed upon the seller, in connection with the settlement.”82 
While RESPA includes many notable requirements, it fails to 
specifically curb questionable fees and practices that commonly deceive 
buyers—particularly subprime buyers.  Among the questionable practices 
that have managed to slip through the cracks of RESPA is the yield 
spread—a bonus paid to lenders for selling higher rates which is often not 
disclosed to the consumer.  Additionally, policing of RESPA requirements 
is rare; for example, closing documents are often prepared the day of 
settlement, leaving insufficient time for meaningful disclosure of all the 
facts. 
3.  The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act 
The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”) was 
adopted by Congress in 1994.83  HOEPA was established primarily to 
combat predatory lending.84  The law prohibits loans from including 
certain abusive terms, and also expands TILA’s disclosure requirements. 
Unlike TILA, which applies to every residential mortgage loan, HOEPA 
applies only to a certain class of “High Cost Mortgages.”85  Under 
HOEPA, certain problematic mortgages trigger red flags which require 
heightened regulation and disclosure requirements.  These triggers include: 
(1) high-cost mortgages, negative amortization loans, or zero interest 
loans; (2) loans that subject the borrower to high cost late payments; (3) 
loans that have high-penalty interest rates; (4) loans that include balloon 
                                                                                                                          
79 Id. 
80 Id. § 2604(a)–(b). 
81 Id. § 2604(c). 
82 Id. § 2603.  This form was later created by the division of Housing and Urban Development 
and came to be known as the HUD form.  Ironically, the government-established HUD form is less than 
intuitive and arguably not conspicuous about back end fees and kickbacks that do not directly affect the 
buyer or seller’s bottom line.  See infra Part IV.B.2. (discussing the covert “yield spread premium” and 
its indirect effect on the borrower’s monthly payments). 
83 The Homeownership and Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2000). 
84 Keyfetz, supra note 76, at 173–76. 
85 Id. 
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payments beyond five years; and (5) loans to candidates that are qualified 
strictly by collateral without regard to the borrower’s ability to make the 
predetermined payments.86 
While many of the provisions are significant, a major criticism of 
HOEPA is that the triggers are not inclusive enough to stop most predatory 
lending that occurred throughout the subprime lending crisis and that the 
statute of limitations is too limiting.87  As a result, HOEPA did not have 
enough “teeth” for most loans and allowed the extensive predatory lending 
to occur under the radar of the HOEPA “trigger requirements.” 
4.  The Fair Housing Act 
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 was passed by Congress as Title VIII of 
the Civil Rights Act.88  This act requires owners, sellers, landlords, and 
maintenance companies to give equal opportunity to all classes of people 
in the housing market.89  The focus of the statute is to provide equal rights 
for those seeking to purchase or rent real property, access broker 
representation, and utilize marketing services.  The statute specifically 
protects individuals of different “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, 
or national origin.”90 
From a general perspective, this statute has provided significant 
protection for the classes defined therein.  However, in the mortgage 
lending industry specifically, minorities are often the target for egregious 
subprime loans, termed by some as predatory loans.  In fact, fifty percent 
of all subprime loans were issued within African American neighborhoods 
as compared to only nine percent in neighborhoods where whites were the 
majority.91  Admittedly, Congress has worked to update some of these 
                                                                                                                          
86 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639(a)–(c), (h); Emily Jeffcott, The Mortgage Reform and Anti Predatory Act of 
2007: Paving a Secure Path for Minorities in the Midst of the Sub Prime Debacle, 10 ST. MARY’S L. 
REV. ON MINORITY ISSUES 449, 465–68 (2008). 
87 Keyfetz, supra note 76, at 189–90.  Moreover: 
HOEPA’s triggers, which are either set far above market interest rates, or are 
incredibly difficult to calculate, and therefore only capture a small percentage of the 
subprime home equity loan market. . . . [T]he statute contains several significant 
limitations:  (1) A one-year statute of limitations for damages and three-year statute 
of limitations for rescission; (2) HOEPA’s strict liability rescission remedy only 
applies to violations of HOEPA, rather than to “all claims and defenses” for the 
damages remedy; and (3) HOEPA’s augmented due diligence requirement is 
ambiguous.  In part, these limitations resulted unintentionally from sloppily drafting 
HOEPA within TILA’s existing structural and remedial scheme.  At the same time, 
the limitations were intentional compromises between advocates for borrowers and 
lenders.  Either way, these limitations, along with HOEPA’s very high triggers, have 
combined to leave few borrowers with the ability to take advantage of the rights 
created by HOEPA’s assignee liability provisions. 
Id. 
88 The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–31 (2006). 
89 Id. § 3604. 
90 Id. 
91 Jeffcott, supra note 86, at 498 (“In totality, the subprime lending market has caused not only 
enormous damage to minorities and their communities, but also significant damage to the world 
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older federal laws in order to deal with predatory lending and egregious 
subprime lending.92  But, these proposals offer only minor changes in 
specific products or limited practice areas.  Additionally, current proposals 
for mortgage reform offer solutions with little to no federal infrastructure 
to provide centralized oversight, regulation, and follow up. 
B.  The Solution Should Be Administered on the Federal Level 
The argument over which level of government should regulate each 
aspect of American life began during the 1700s and has persisted in 
politics to this day.  The controversy over whether the federal or state 
governments should oversee mortgage reform has received similar 
attention.93  While Congress has enumerated many broad mortgage 
regulations, critics maintain that these restraints have not been specific or 
expansive enough to curb the widespread predatory lending, irresponsible 
buying, and unjustified speculation.94  In an effort to fill the federal 
regulatory gaps, some states have become increasingly aggressive in 
regulating the industry, and as a result—for example—approximately half 
of the states have developed some type of legislation to combat predatory 
lending.95  In light of the nationwide financial crisis of 2008—which 
arguably stemmed from the country’s inadequate mortgage regulation—the 
question of whether Congress should take additional regulatory steps, or 
leave the individual states to regulate, has become especially pressing.  
Perhaps the most important question in determining whether state or 
federal jurisdiction should head mortgage reform is the one posed by 
                                                                                                                          
market.  Because state regulation is limited, it is necessary to promulgate effective federal legislation 
that will tackle the roots and continuing effects of subprime lending.”). 
92 In October of 2007, Bradley Miller sponsored a bill to amend TILA called the Mortgage 
Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act which was designed to address many predatory lending 
problems that occurred during the previous decade since TILA.  The Mortgage Reform and Anti-
Predatory Lending Act, http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d110:4:./temp/~bdEcWL:@@@ 
D&summ2=m&|/bss/d110query.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).  In May of 2007, the Senate briefly 
considered and sent to committee another bill named the Borrower’s Protection Act (“BPA”).  The 
BPA attempts to establish a fiduciary duty between the mortgage broker and borrower in order to 
protect the borrower.  The bill also established standards for assessing whether or not a borrower has 
the ability and financial capacity to repay a loan.  The Borrower’s Protection Act, 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s1299is.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2008). 
93 See Lloyd Wilson, Sometimes Less Is More: Utility, Preemption, and Hermeneutical Criticisms 
of Proposed Federal Regulation of Mortgage Brokers, 59 S.C. L. REV 62, 62 (2007) (“Regulatory 
responses to predatory lending have from the outset raised two interrelated questions:  What kinds of 
regulations will best combat predatory lending and Who should enact those regulations?  The former 
question asks what types of loan terms and lending practices should be proscribed or prescribed; the 
latter question asks which level of government, federal or state, is in the better position to make the 
policy judgments that inform the regulation of mortgage lending activities.”). 
94 See supra Part III.A. (describing current federal mortgage laws and outlining some 
inefficiencies and shortcomings); see also Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: 
Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2005). 
95 Peterson, supra note 94, at 5. 
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Christopher Peterson: 
Is [] lending [reform] most akin to family law, criminal law, 
and small purely local commercial ventures, and therefore, 
most appropriately addressed by the states?  Or, does [] 
lending more closely resemble foreign policy or interstate 
commerce and, accordingly, merit federal oversight?  Or 
finally, is this a mixed-federal question deserving of shared 
responsibility?96 
Some hold that relying on states to regulate mortgage lending has 
created a dizzyingly disparate patchwork of regulatory practices that has 
failed to ensure consistent consumer protection.97  Conversely, others insist 
that federal attempts to regulate the mortgage industry through preemptive 
efforts have backfired and effectively worked to deregulate mortgage law 
in states that have made progressive strides toward mortgage reform.98  
The result—for the time being—is that mortgage regulation has become a 
delicate mixture of both federal and state oversight.  This framework for 
legislation has caused state and federal authorities to point fingers at one 
another to take action, and has resulted in sluggish reform.  This Note 
asserts that mortgage reform should be advanced by the central-federal 
government. 
1.  Supreme Court Precedent 
Three landmark cases help provide a foundation and framework for 
any discussion dealing with whether to limit or expand federal legislative 
authority.  In the first case, McCulloch v. Maryland the Supreme Court 
considered whether Congress had authority to create a federal bank and 
whether Maryland had the power to tax that bank.99  The former 
question—most pertinent to this Note’s proposal to create a Federal 
Mortgage Insurance Corporation—was answered by Justice Marshall who 
outlined four arguments supporting Congress’ authority to charter a federal 
bank: (1) Congress had authority because of precedent stemming from the 
fact that it was a power previously used; (2) Congress had authority 
because states did not retain ultimate sovereignty evidenced in their 
ratification of the Constitution; (3) Congress had authority because the 
Constitution provided broad powers to Congress to enable it to perform in 
                                                                                                                          
96 Id. at 8 (discussing a series of questions about mortgage regulation that the author believes are 
important and pressing. Peterson, however, did not presume to answer the question:  “I take no position 
on the level of government from which predatory lending policy should emanate.”). 
97 See Jeffcott, supra note 86, at 455–56 (“The current legislation aimed at regulating subprime 
lending and preventing predatory lending has proven largely ineffective. . . . Because these statutes 
have not provided the necessary protection to borrowers, states have been forced to enact their own 
anti-predatory legislation, which has resulted in highly uneven practices among the states.”). 
98 See Peterson, supra note 94, at 8. 
99 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819). 
 342 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:319 
a multitude of varying circumstances; and (4) Congress had authority 
under the necessary and proper clause.100  The McCulloch decision helped 
set early precedent for construing congressional powers broadly, allowing 
Congress to intervene where activities had a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.101  This broad construction of the Constitution continued into 
the twentieth century.102  In fact, between 1937 and 1995 the Supreme 
Court did not find a single congressional statutory enactment outside 
constitutional limitations.103 
It was not until 1995 that the Supreme Court began taking steps to 
restrain Congress’s power to legislate under the commerce power.  In 
United States v. Lopez, the court considered whether Congress had 
authority to legislate the “Gun-Free School Zones Act” under the 
commerce clause.104  The court identified three categories of activities that 
Congress had power to regulate under the commerce clause: (1) the 
channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of commerce; 
and (3) activities that have a “substantial relation” to commerce among the 
several states.105  While Lopez narrowed congressional legislative power 
under the commerce clause, the Court emphasized that the primary reason 
for the narrowing was because the statute dealt with matters that did not 
“substantially affect” interstate commerce.106  Along this vein, there is no 
question that the past mortgage crisis substantially affected interstate 
commerce. 
Another case that may provide some indication of the Supreme Court’s 
perspective on Congress’ ability to legislate mortgage matters is United 
States v. Perez.107  In Perez, the defendant—a lending institution—claimed 
that Title II of the Consumer Protection Act was not constitutional because 
Congress did not have authority to regulate the lending of intrastate 
money.108  The Court countered that Congress had the authority because 
certain types of loans––though traditionally local––had a national affect.109 
Assuming that there is a rational basis for Congress to believe that 
mortgage lending activities have a sufficient effect on intrastate commerce, 
the argument for centralized reform is strong.  Even though commerce 
clause arguments against centralized reform are relatively weak, there are 
several policy arguments—both supporting and opposing centralized 
                                                                                                                          
100 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 233–37 (2d ed. 
2002); see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 410–17. 
101 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 100, at 232. 
102 Id. at 234. 
103 Id. 
104 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). 
105 Id. at 558–59. 
106 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 100, at 266. 
107 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
108 Id. at 146–47. 
109 Id. at 156–57. 
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reform—that may transcend the issue of whether congress has the power or 
not. 
2.  The Argument for State-Based Regulation 
One argument for state based legislation asserts that, to date, 
Congress’s mortgage preemption statutes have proven largely ineffective 
because they are proposed under the guise of federalism when the 
underlying action is destructive deregulation.110  This argument suggests 
that bipartisan politics favoring deregulation, under the pretense of 
federalism, have waylaid Congress from enacting mortgage reform with 
strong utility.111  Thus, many of the federal preemptive laws are without 
force and end up providing the mortgage industry with more latitude than 
the states originally provided.  In this way, federal mortgage legislation can 
be—and arguably has been—more destructive than helpful. 
Another argument is founded on the idea that the states have a greater 
capacity to legislate for the needs and intricacies of their own complicated 
economies than Congress.112  In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the U.S. Supreme 
Court found that pure federalism—state-based regulation—increased the 
opportunity for citizens to be involved in the democratic processes.113  
Scholars in this camp insist that government regulation on a smaller scale 
increases communication between the elected officials writing the statutes 
and the citizens that are affected by the ensuing laws.114  This line of 
reasoning provides justification for the relatively lax mortgage laws in 
states that sold less real estate during the destructive subprime era while 
simultaneously justifying the stringent subprime laws in states that had a 
five-hundred percent increase in subprime lending during 2000–06.115  In 
this way, states with different characteristics can retain the ability to pass 
varying degrees of mortgage regulation. 
Another argument assumes that allowing individual states to create 
separate mortgage laws provides the most effective means of 
experimenting with new law.  Supporters of this reasoning assert that the 
state legislative-laboratory is the crowning virtue of federalism.116  This 
argument also provides that state level decision making is less stifled and 
                                                                                                                          
110 Peterson, supra note 94, at 8. 
111 Id. 
112 See Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 392 (2005) 
(“[The] value of federalism is that it promotes the democratic ideal because state governments are more 
closely in tune with their citizens and therefore more accountable and responsive to local constituent 
needs.”). 
113 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); Azmy, supra note 112, at 392. 
114 Azmy, supra note 112, at 391–92. 
115 Id. at 301. 
116 See id. at 390–93 (explaining that the state laboratory is the best forum for legislation; but, this 
argument assumes that regulation from the top down—federal—is tailored to preempt the more 
effective, fair, and efficient result that is inevitably discovered through the state trial and error process). 
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thus more innovative and open to experimentation.  Justice Brandeis stated 
that federal efforts to trump individual state experimentation would have 
an adverse affect on the innovation and success of the federal system; that 
the state laboratories provide risk management in preparing, conceiving, 
and cultivating law that can be later implemented on a federal level.117  
Supporters of a state based regime insist that even if federal legislation is 
the answer, it should be stayed for several years or even decades in order to 
allow for further evaluation and reflection on varying state reforms 
currently in flux.118 
And, finally, there is the age-old argument first posed by early anti-
federalists—supporters of a decentralized government as originally 
instituted in the Articles of Confederation—that state governments are an 
important check on the central government and minimize the “likelihood of 
tyranny” in mortgage reform.119 
3.  The Argument for Federal Based Regulation 
Despite persuasive arguments for state-based regulation, the several 
arguments supporting centralized federal reform within the mortgage 
industry prove more convincing.  First, state legislation is a slow process 
and does not provide the requisite nationwide solutions to curtail a 
widespread meltdown of the nation’s economic framework.  This has been 
especially evident during the latter half of 2008.  Though many states 
began altering mortgage laws as early as 2000, no single state’s actions 
were enough to prevent the country’s widespread market crisis.120  The 
original Framers knew that complete sovereignty of states would be a slow 
and ineffective way to govern the country and thus, after just ten years 
under the Articles of Confederation—the ultimate federalist regime—the 
states ventured to create a centralized government to regulate, govern, 
negotiate, tax, and legislate. 
Second, history has shown that an industry can be more stable and 
simultaneously increase in efficiency when the federal government 
provides capital reserves.  For example, the general success of the FDIC 
and the Fed as stabilizers of our increasingly complex economy is evident.  
                                                                                                                          
117 Id. at 301 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis J., 
dissenting)). 
118 Id. at 393–94 (“[N]o uniform national solution should be imposed until more data is available 
to evaluate whether the state reforms have worked or will work.  More specifically, evaluation factors 
should include: (i) whether the variety of state options have worked in their jurisdictions to ameliorate 
predatory lending or whether unscrupulous lenders have been successful, as they often are, in 
circumventing state restrictions and (ii) whether state laws have been or would be counterproductive, as 
the banking industry has suggested, by increasing compliance costs and liability risks to greatly that 
legitimate subprime credit is driven out of the communities which the predatory lending laws were 
intended to help.”). 
119 Id. at 391. 
120 See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing individual state reform, obviously none 
of which stayed the market crisis during 2008). 
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Both of these institutions have the ability to provide funds in times of 
economic volatility and turmoil and each successfully functions in its role 
to stabilize the economy.121  On one hand, from a utilitarian perspective, it 
is wise to leverage federalist ideals and allow states to develop innovative 
and original legislation by trial and error.  On the other hand, it is 
important for Congress to evaluate and implement the tried and proven 
state mortgage laws on a national scale.  Major mortgage reform was first 
implemented following the depression and has since had nearly eighty 
years of state reformation.  Now, in the wake of significant need for 
nationwide mortgage reform, Congress should use its authority to build on 
past regulatory ideas (e.g., TILA, HOEPA, FHA), past state innovations in 
mortgage law, and past modes of insurance (e.g., FDIC, FHA,VA) to 
provide a solution (e.g., the FMIC). 
Third, federal legislation would provide consistency where different 
state governments currently vary significantly, a problem that exposes 
some consumers to “under-protection” and others to “overprotection.”122  
Consider for example, that while some states have “acknowledged that 
lending abuses are occurring within their borders” they have still not 
adopted the necessary laws.123  In contrast, other states have enacted laws 
that have been so restrictive that lenders have become reluctant to move 
forward with any type of subprime loans—thus ostracizing the state’s 
subprime borrowers.124  A well-considered centralized regulatory regime, 
constructed with past federal laws and programs, would establish a 
stronger and more consistent foundation for customized state regulation. 
Therefore, there is little question about whether Congress has the 
“constitutional power” to lead-out in mortgage reform.  And, though there 
are several strong arguments for allowing states to continue leading out in 
mortgage reform, the magnitude of the recent mortgage crisis has dimmed 
the luster of the federalist ideal championing decentralized mortgage 
regulation.  The mortgage lending industry has proven during 2008 that it 
needs significant reform, consistent interstate regulation, and large 
centralized capital reserves in order to be reliable and self-sustaining. 
C.  The Solution Must Be Capable of Providing Large Amounts of Capital 
There are dozens of ways to stabilize an industry through regulation, 
oversight, and risk management, but when calamity strikes, industries 
require access to capital reserves.  Most agree that a sharp downturn in a 
                                                                                                                          
121 Sheila Bair, FDIC Chairman, Address at the 75th Anniversary Kick Off Press Conference, 
(June 16, 2008), available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2008/chairman/spjun 
1708.html (“Since the FDIC was created, there have been no significant bank runs.”). 
122 Azmy, supra note 112, at 374–78. 
123 Id. at 376–77. 
124 Id. at 378. 
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market—as a result of a housing market bubble collapse, for example—is 
most effectively dealt with by an injection of capital; however, the question 
of where that capital should come from is a different matter.125  The bank 
run of 1907, the Great Depression, the stock market crash of 1987, the dot 
com crash of 2000, the Japan Crisis, and Mexico’s Peso Crisis all attest to 
the fact that capital reserves can be the best solution when systemic 
calamity is inevitable.126  Lawmakers, scholars, industry professionals, and 
the nation’s taxpayers are left to decide on the source from which the 
money should come.  Is the best solution to have the government bail out 
financial intermediaries like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac when the market 
plummets?  Is the answer to have every financial intermediary morph into 
a bank holding company (insured by the FDIC) and allow access to 
consumer deposits and the Fed’s discount window?127  Whether capital 
comes from a government bailout or whether insurance companies are 
formerly set up to mitigate risk, history has shown that a struggling 
                                                                                                                          
125 FRIEDMAN, supra note 35, at 79–86, 91 (arguing that one of the greatest mistakes during the 
Great Depression was the Federal Reserve’s hesitation to inject capital into the market); Press Release, 
Financial Services Agency, Global Financial Crisis and Japan’s Experience in the 1990s (Oct. 25, 
2008), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/announce/state/20081025.html. 
126 The Japan Crisis and the Mexico Peso Crisis have been repeatedly cited by United States’ 
economists as quintessential examples of the positive effects of large-scale capital infusion during 
times of systemic calamity.  See Martin Fackler, In Japan, Financial Crisis is Just a Ripple, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at C4; see also Dr. Takafumi Sato, Comm’r of the Fin. Servs. Agency, Remarks 
at the Symposium on Building the Financial System of the 21st Century (Oct. 25, 2008), available at 
http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/announce/state/20081025.html.  Describing similarities to the U.S. economic 
crisis and the Japan economic crisis, the Commissioner of Financial Services offered this opinion: 
[U]ndercapitalization of financial firms needs to be addressed, by injecting public 
funds if necessary.  Prompt and sufficient recapitalization is needed if a financial 
firm becomes undercapitalized as a result of the disposal of bad assets.  In cases 
where a sufficient amount of capital cannot be raised on a market basis, 
recapitalization with public funds is effective as a final safety net.  While capital 
injection does put taxpayers’ money at risk, it may end up with benefiting taxpayers 
if successful.  In Japan, the government injected 12.4 trillion yen in 37 banks, of 
which 9.2 trillion yen has already been repaid, of which capital gains amount to 1.3 
trillion yen.  These are on top of a cumulative dividend income of 770 billion yen as 
of end-March 2008.  In this respect, I welcome the decision of the U.S. government 
to commit 250 billion dollars to recapitalize the financial firms.  At the same time, 
the authorities should be flexible in responding to new, additional developments.  
Losses could grow further, because the adverse effect of the deteriorating real 
economy could hit financial firms if a substantial amount of bad assets remain on 
their balance sheets. 
Id.; see also Edwin M. Truman, The Mexican Peso Crisis: Implications for International Finance, 
Federal Reserve Bulletin 199–205 (Mar. 1996), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
pubs/bulletin/1996/396lead.pdf (discussing the decision by Congress to contribute up to $40 billion to 
stop the financial bleeding in Mexico during the 1994 Mexico Peso Crisis). 
127 See Jones, supra note 47 (discussing that as a result of the financial crisis, several  major 
companies—Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and American Express—have become bank holding 
companies in order to take advantage of the insurance offered to depositors through the FDIC.  This 
change in entity type allows the corporation to more easily access depositor’s money.  Additionally, as 
a bank holding company, the federal government insures the depositor financing so the process of 
obtaining capital is not as volatile as the investor market—and certainly a more reliable avenue for 
income during economic turmoil.  Also, companies that morph into bank holding companies can take 
advantage of the TARP plan and the Federal Reserve’s discount window.). 
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industry can usually gain footing as long as it has access to capital.  
Conversely, history has also shown that large companies and industries 
that face an economic downturn coupled with clogged capital flow, fail.128  
In the words of prominent economist Milton Freedman: in times of crisis 
the key is “expanding the money supply.”129  From a historical perspective, 
when a large and indispensible industry has failed—such as the mortgage 
lending industry—the central government has been forced to provide 
capital. 
One way to create emergency capital is to force big companies to pay 
for their own insurance in the form of a “failure tax.”  In a recent New York 
Times article, Jonathan Koppell opined that “the Federal Reserve and the 
Treasury Department are acting like insurance claims adjusters, selectively 
providing assistance when a company’s failure seems too much for the 
financial markets to withstand.”130  As a result, Koppell suggested that 
investment banks and other large companies should be required to pay 
premiums for catastrophic risk insurance, similar to government imposed 
flood, bank, and crop insurance.131  Koppell proposed that the concept of 
imposing an insurance premium on big companies should be appropriately 
named the “failure tax.”132  Koppell’s idea may be worth debating because, 
after all, the government’s $700 billion bail-out plan is a type of “failure 
tax” for big corporations—with premiums imposed on all the wrong 
people.  The truth is that Koppell’s idea is not all that novel.  
Congressmen, who lived through the Great Depression and felt the adverse 
effects of market illiquidity, created the FDIC insurance program to 
provide the very type of industry insurance Koppell called for in his article.  
Similarly, many of those same lawmakers established the FHA insurance 
program to promote market confidence and lender reserves.133 
A second method for building catastrophic capital reserves would to 
force individual lending institutions to increase their reserves.  This 
regulatory regime could emulate the relatively new banking regulations set 
forth under Basel II.134  Through the creation of Basel II, several prominent 
countries agreed to require their banks to carry a certain percentage of 
capital for each asset, depending on how that asset was weighted on an 
                                                                                                                          
128 Andrew Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html?pagewanted=all. 
129 FRIEDMAN, supra note 35, at 70–79. 
130 Koppell, supra note 69. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Additionally, lawmakers who suffered through the bank run of 1907 formulated the Federal 
Reserve to be a lender of last resort. 
134 Press Release, OCC Approves Basel II Capital Rule (Nov. 1, 2007), available at 
http://www.occ.gov/ftp/release/2007-123.htm. 
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index that determined general risk levels.135  The index requires banks to 
weigh credit risk, market risk, operational risk, interest rate risk, and 
liquidity risk—against capital reserves.136 
It is no secret that the federal charter for Fannie, Freddie, and Ginnie 
requires a similar kind of risk based capital requirement, but these 
requirements are obviously not sufficient in light of the recent government 
bailout.  The problem with simply doubling the risk based capital 
requirement for mortgage lending institutions nationwide is the 
impracticability and wasteful result of requiring several trillion dollars be 
set aside in a savings account to hedge against risk.  More money being set 
aside means fewer loans, fewer homeowners, and inefficient lending. 
A third method for creating catastrophic financial reserves would be to 
use the full faith and credit of the U.S. government as the source of capital.  
In effect, this is the model that the country has been using.  As previously 
noted, this model socializes risk and privatizes profits: it effectively creates 
moral hazard. 
Finally, another way to create emergency capital may be by morphing 
the concept of the “failure tax” into a federal-government-required 
insurance program.  Emergency capital reserves can be best realized by 
requiring institutions to pay for their own insurance: industry paid 
insurance is resourceful, fair to the taxpayer, and effective as an opponent 
of risk.  The FDIC is a prime example of the practice of these principles.  
Banking institutions contribute a small percent of each deposit to the FDIC 
and the insurance entity agrees to take on the liability should the company 
require financial assistance.  While the insurance is for the depositor, the 
institutions—which create the systemic risk—are the primary parties 
responsible for paying the premium.137  Insurance premiums trend upward 
as a result of increased risk; thus fundamental insurance principles deter 
moral hazard (as opposed to government bailouts that increase moral 
hazard).  Importantly, paying insurance premiums would not require 
companies or industries to excessively gather cash in order to hedge 
against risk.  The Institutions that would potentially utilize the funds would 
be paying for the “capital reserve,” and thus notions of equity would be 
                                                                                                                          
135 Id. at 8 (“Capital helps protect individual banks from insolvency, thereby promoting safety and 
soundness in the overall U.S. banking system.  Minimum risk-based capital requirements establish a 
threshold below which a sound bank’s risk-based capital must not fall.  Risk-based capital ratios permit 
some comparative analysis of capital adequacy across banks because they are based on certain common 
assumptions.  However, supervisors must perform a more comprehensive review of capital adequacy 
that considers the risks that are specific to each individual bank, including those not incorporated in 
risk-based capital requirements.  In short, supervisors must ensure that a bank’s overall capital does not 
fall below the level required to support its entire risk profile.”). 
136 Id. at 8–18. 
137 There are two ways to consider how the insurance “expense” is paid.  From the less obvious 
perspective, the payment is internalized by the depositor in light of the fact that decreased interest rates 
available on deposits into the institution are the ultimate result of the FDIC expense. 
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served. 
IV.  THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The United States’ legal framework for mortgage lending is 
insufficient: oversight is sporadic, state laws are inconsistent, federal laws 
are inadequate, lenders and banks are under-insured, and the federal 
government has erroneously become the primary insurer.  This section 
proposes that the federal government create a centralized entity to regulate, 
oversee, and insure the nationwide mortgage industry: the entity could be 
appropriately named the Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation 
(“FMIC”).  The FMIC could be required to meet all the ideals set forth in 
the previous sections,138 by providing mortgage reform, industry stability, 
capital reserves, and uniform federal mortgage lending laws.  The next two 
sections outline how this entity could function and the benefits it would 
potentially provide the lending industry. 
A.  Capital Reserves by Insurance 
Assuming that the mortgage industry would benefit from capital 
reserves derived from insurance during a time of financial crisis—as 
discussed in the previous section139—the natural ensuing question would 
be, “Who would pay for the insurance, and how would the FMIC manage 
the insurance program?” 
To answer the question, it is important to note that some mortgage 
loans are already insured.  That said, most mortgage debt in the country is 
not insured.  Several different entities and industries have provided 
insurance for mortgage loans during the past century.  First, the FHA, 
created during the Great Depression, currently insures some first-time-
homebuyer loans that meet certain criteria.140  Second, the Veterans 
Administration (“VA”) insures some mortgage home loans for those who 
have participated in the military.141  Third, the PMI industry insures the 
greatest number of home loans in the country; but this insurance covers 
only twenty percent of the loan amount.142  Finally, the recently enacted 
Hope for Homeowners (“HFH”) legislation retroactively insures distressed 
homeowner mortgages where lenders are willing to write down a portion 
of the principle—though this program has only been marginally 
                                                                                                                          
138 See supra Part III (discussing the three ideal guidelines for a solution: mortgage reform, 
federally based guidelines, and large capital reserves). 
139 See supra Part III (discussing guidelines for a solution). 
140 About the Federal Housing Administration, http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page?_pageid=73, 
1828027&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (last visited July 29, 2009). 
141 Department of Veteran Affairs, http://www.va.gov/about_va (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). 
142 MICA FACTBOOK, supra note 29, at 14. 
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successful.143  The industry’s massive requirements for capital during a 
large market failure—such as that which occurred during 2008—cannot 
likely be serviced through any of these entities (or industries) because of 
the limited goals and scope of each.  The following subsections describe 
the insurance characteristics of the FMIC. 
1.  FMIC to Insure Loans Exceeding Fifty Percent of Property Values 
In order to properly curb the systemic risk posed by the mortgage 
industry, the FMIC must provide insurance for at least fifty percent of 
mortgage loan amount.  As stated earlier, most home loans are not fully 
insured, but among the home-loans currently insured, most are covered by 
the PMI industry.  Unfortunately, the private insurance industry only 
provides insurance for between five to twenty percent of the full loan 
amount.144  While this protection provides relative mortgage lender support 
in most market conditions, recent real estate bubble deflation in several 
states—including California and Florida—has reached nearly forty percent 
value declines.145  After making interest payments, paying attorney costs, 
and absorbing losses due to under-maintenance, banks in 2008 were losing 
an average of forty-four percent of the mortgage loan amount.146  Thus, 
losses on privately insured assets far outweighed private mortgage 
insurance compensation.147 
Thus, the federal government should require the FMIC insurance on all 
home loans that exceed fifty percent loan to value (“LTV”).148  This 
                                                                                                                          
143 Paletta et al., supra note 26 (discussing the marginal success of the Hope for Homeowners 
program that was initiated in an effort to slow foreclosures, but requires the lender to take losses up 
front). 
144 MICA FACTBOOK, supra note 29, at 14. 
145 Brad Davidson, Median Price Heading South of 400K, Oct. 6, 2008, available at 
http://www.socalbubble.com/ (“The median price continues to fall and if the trend holds it should be 
under $400,000 by year’s end.  That will be close to a forty percent decline.”). 
146 Paletta et al., supra note 26.  To reiterate the need for extensive mortgage industry insurance, 
common sense shows that a precipitous fall in housing prices (a bubble burst as a result of irrational 
exuberance) could easily trigger each of the factors that would inevitably lead to widespread market 
failure.  The cycle begins with a (1) drop in housing prices (2) that increases foreclosures (3) and 
increases the average losses by lenders in each foreclosure, (4) the banks panic and cut back lending, 
(5) real estate sales slow, (6) housing prices drop further, (7) and the cycle continues.  Thus, each 
housing bubble that reaches sufficient magnitude will inevitably lead to secondary market failure as 
long as proper insurance (or an alternative capital reserve) is not in place. 
147 There are other ways to “insure” a loan not evaluated in this Note.  Some banks allow the 
borrower to leverage one hundred percent of the mortgage value while as long as the first loan for 
eighty percent remains in “primary position.”  In this scenario, the mortgagor is able to obtain a twenty 
percent loan from a second institution at a much higher interest rate.  This “80/20” loan structure puts 
the secondary market investor in essentially the same position as though the mortgagor had purchased 
twenty percent private mortgage insurance.  This loan structure is acceptable under Fannie Mae’s 
charter.  But, this “insurance” proved similarly insufficient during 2008, when the average foreclosure 
cost in the nation rose to forty-four percent of the loan amount—more than double the “insured” 
(secondary loan) amount. 
148 For example, consider three hypothetical buyers that each purchase three different houses on 
the same street for $100,000: Buyer A, Buyer B, and Buyer C.  A pays $100,000 in cash.  A is exempt 
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insurance would not be required on homes with forty-nine percent LTV or 
less.  Similar to the government standards currently imposed on the PMI 
and FHA programs, the FMIC insurance payments and coverage would 
automatically cease once the LTV dropped below fifty percent.149 
2.  FMIC to Insure All Qualifying Loans 
In order to provide a meaningful capital reserve, the FMIC must insure 
all loans that exceed fifty percent loan to value.  This characteristic of the 
FMIC is an important addition to the previous section in light of the fact 
that the government already provides “one hundred percent insurance” for 
home loans that qualify through the FHA.  But, because of stringent FHA 
borrower requirements, the FHA only insures a small portion of the home 
loan industry: the FHA insures approximately $680 billion of the $13 
trillion in outstanding mortgage debt.150  Stated differently, the FHA 
insures approximately five percent of the nation’s mortgage debt.151  
However, the relatively small number of FHA insured loans have not been 
an indication of the program’s success in its sphere.  The FHA has not 
aspired to be a large institution in order to provide support against systemic 
risk.152  In fact, FHA and VA loans purposefully exclude many prime 
buyers in order to focus on subprime needs.153  The FHA limiting criteria 
include the requirement that the mortgagor must occupy the home within 
sixty days of purchase, purchase a home within the price range set by the 
administration, and purchase either a single-family residence or duplex, 
                                                                                                                          
from contributing to the FMIC insurance premiums because she has no LTV on her house and she 
poses zero risk to the lending industry.  B pays $60,000 in cash and receives a loan from a lender for 
$40,000.  B is exempt from contributing to the FMIC insurance program because in the event that the 
lender must foreclose on her house to recoup the $40,000 loan, B has $60,000 in equity—which is the 
equivalent of sixty percent insurance on the loan.  C pays $10,000 in cash and receives a loan for 
$90,000.  C must contribute to FMIC insurance premiums because if the house is foreclosed—
foreclosure costs the lender an average of forty-four percent in today’s economy—the lender will only 
have the equivalent of ten percent ($10,000) insurance on the home.  The FMIC would continue to 
require insurance contributions until C pays another $40,000 in principal.  When C only owes $50,000 
on the house, the FMIC payments would stop b/c the lender could use C’s $50,000 equity as insurance 
on fifty percent of the loan.  
149 Current federal law requires that when the LTV reaches the private mortgage insurance 
carrier’s coverage amount (traditionally twenty percent) the insurance carrier must automatically cease 
billing the consumer.  MICA FACTBOOK, supra note 29, at 20.  This automatic trigger is a safeguard 
for consumers that historically would pay for needless insurance long past its coverage, without 
realizing that the insurance payment was a part of their monthly mortgage payment.  This is true for 
FHA insured loans as well.  
150 Review and Outlook, The Next Fannie Mae: Ginnie Mae and FHA Are Becoming $1 Trillion 
Subprime Guarantors, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2009, at A16; U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2008, at 735 (2008); Federal Housing Administration Website, 
http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page?_pageid=73,1&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (last visited Dec. 
15, 2008). 
151 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 150, at 735. 
152 About the Federal Housing Administration, http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page?_pageid= 
73,1828027&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). 
153 Id. 
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three-plex, or four-plex.154 
As previously discussed, the PMI industry provides a significant 
portion of the United States’ mortgage insurance.  During 2007, the PMI 
industry was obligated to approximately $800 billion of insurance, which 
represented approximately six percent of the mortgage debt in the 
country.155  Thus, after combining both the federal government insurance 
and private insurance program coverage,156 most of the mortgage debt in 
the country remains uninsured.  During the 1980’s, the PMI industry paid 
approximately six billion dollars in claims to its policyholders.157  During 
the 1990’s, the PMI industry paid approximately eight billion dollars in 
claims.158  During just one year—2008—industry wide losses reached 
several hundred billion dollars while the mortgage insurance industry only 
paid out approximately $15 billion.159  While the PMI industry is not large 
enough to quell systemic risk, it has shown notable resilience during tough 
economic times.  The achievements of both the FHA and PMI industries 
provide some testimony of the likely success that the FMIC would have if 
it functioned on a larger scale.  Additionally, in light of the inability of the 
FHA and PMI insurance programs to quell widespread home loan 
calamity, the FMIC must provide insurance for all home loans that meet 
the fifty percent LTV standard in order to meaningfully curb systemic 
risk.160 
3.  FMIC Premium Payments 
There are several ways the FMIC could potentially raise funds to pay 
for the government sponsored loan insurance.  The most practical model 
may be to require the borrower to pay a mortgage insurance premium 
monthly until the LTV drops below fifty percent.  The FHA program and 
the PMI industry currently rely on this model to pay insurance premiums 
and have shown that the payment does not prove so onerous as to deter 
                                                                                                                          
154 FHA.com, FHA Limits, http://www.fha.com/lending_limits_state.cfm?state=CONNECTICUT 
(last visited July 29, 2009) (enumerating the restrictions on applicants that qualify for FHA insurance 
including, for example, restrictions on housing prices for Hartford Connecticut: $440,000 for a single 
family residence; $563,250 for a duplex; $680,850 for a triplex; and $846,150 for a four-plex). 
155 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 150, at 735; see also MICA FACTBOOK, supra note 29, 
at 23. 
156 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 150, at 735. 
157 MICA FACTBOOK, supra note 29, at 13. 
158 Id. at 14. 
159 MORTGAGE INSURANCE COMPANIES OF AMERICA, 2009–2010 FACT BOOK & MEMBER 
DIRECTORY 15 (2009–10) (discussing that in 2008, during the housing market collapse, mortgage 
insurers paid out approximately $15 billion in claims); Yalman Onaran, Subprime Losses Top $379 
Billion on Balance-Sheet, BLOOMBERG, May 19, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=20601087&sid=aK4Z6C2kXs3A&refer=home. 
160 This concept holds true, assuming that the PMI industry does not change to accommodate fifty 
percent LTV coverage, and the FHA program does not change to accommodate all home loans. 
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buyers.161  Not only are the premium payments palatable for the borrower, 
but the government has been able to retain solvency in the FHA program 
for the last several decades.162 
4.  FMIC Capital Reserves 
To effectively avoid a future repeat of the 2008 mortgage industry 
failure, the FMIC must keep reserves that exceed projected needs.  Using 
the example of the FHA program, the federal mortgage insurance entity 
could feasibly retain reserves that allow it to remain solvent even in times 
of extreme market volatility.  The FHA is a mortgage insurance entity that 
has shown that this is possible.  On June 17, 2008 the FHA Commissioner 
Brian Montgomery claimed that: 
Currently, FHA is solvent.  In fact, we have a reserve of 
about $21 billion.  However, as a result of our annual re-
estimate, we had to book an additional of $4.6 billion in 
unanticipated long-term losses, mostly due to the increased 
number of certain types of seller-funded loans in the FHA 
portfolio.  Let me repeat: FHA is solvent.163 
The FDIC provides another example of a federally based insurance 
program created primarily to provide and manage capital reserves for an 
industry.164  In late 2008, the FDIC was busy managing receiverships and 
brokering the acquisition of failing banks with larger stronger banks.165  
This pandemic was spurred by the subprime mortgage years earlier in the 
same decade: during 2005, no banks failed; during 2006, no banks failed; 
during 2007, seven banks collapsed; and, during 2008, at least twelve 
                                                                                                                          
161 About the Federal Housing Administration, http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page?_pageid= 
73,1828027&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).  Incidentally, FHA 
borrowers represent some of the most “leveraged” and “subprime” buyers in the market.  This is largely 
because the program focuses on providing housing for those who would not be able to qualify 
otherwise—particularly in respect to saving a down payment.  The success of the FHA one-hundred-
percent insurance program and its monthly insurance payments are a testament to the likely success of 
an FMIC required fifty-percent insurance program on all loans paid for in a similar manner. 
162 Brian Montgomery, Comm’r of the FHA, Remarks at the National Press Club (June 9, 2008), 
available at http://www.hud.gov/news/speeches/2008-06-09.cfm. 
163 Id. 
164 The FDIC was created in 1933 under the Glass Steagall Act to restore confidence in the 
banking system after more than 4000 banks failed.  See History of the FDIC, 
http://www.fdic.gov/about/history/index.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).  According to the Act, the 
depositor insurance program was organized to safeguard against bank runs and bank failures that 
helped tip off the great depression.  The FDIC functions as an, “independent agency of the federal 
government, [it] was created in 1933 in response to the thousands of bank failures that occurred in the 
1920s and early 1930s.”  Who Is the FDIC?, http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/index.html (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2009). 
165 David Evans, FDIC May Need $150 Billion Bailout as More Banks Fail, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 
25, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid+206011038&sid+amZxIbcjZISU&refer=us. 
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banks failed.166  With so many banks struggling in 2008, the FDIC used up 
its reserves—even to the extent that some economists speculated that the 
FDIC would need nearly $200 billion to avoid borrowing from the 
Treasury before the end of 2009.167  The FHA and the FDIC programs have 
a long history of maintaining capital reserve infrastructure during tough 
economic times and provide important precedent for establishing rules and 
guidelines for future government entities to do the same—entities such as 
the FMIC. 
B.  Mortgage Loan Regulation 
The FMIC would most effectively regulate mortgage lenders by 
applying baseline underwriting, resell, and securitization requirements.  
Lenders who currently require buyers to purchase private mortgage 
insurance look to the insurance carrier to set the guidelines for 
underwriting their loan.  In fact, the PMI industry brags that, “[m]ortgage 
insurers were designed to be review underwriters.  Because they are in the 
first loss position on insured mortgages, they are the second set of eyes 
looking at potential loans to check and see if is safe for both the investor 
and the borrower.”168  This same model is utilized by the United States’ 
dual banking system, where both national and state banks that seek federal 
insurance agree to abide by the guidelines and regulations outlined by the 
FDIC.  By providing federal insurance for the mortgage industry, the 
FMIC could also set the minimum standards for mortgage brokers, primary 
lenders, secondary lenders, and securitization.  Like the FDIC, the FMIC’s 
primary goal would be to provide insurance yet, like the FDIC, it could 
simultaneously examine and supervise financial institutions that it 
insures.169  In this way, the FMIC would force compliance to a host of 
regulations without meeting the opposition that would inevitably come if 
its primary purpose was regulation.  That said, the FMIC could provide 
                                                                                                                          
166 Id.  Contributing to the problem, in September 2008, IndyMac bank failed and became the 
most expensive bank failure in the FDIC’s history at $32 billion.  Id.  Just one week later, Washington 
Mutual followed suit with assets of nearly $310 billion.  Id.  Luckily, as receiver, the FDIC brokered 
the purchase of Washington Mutual with JP Morgan on Sept. 26, 2008.  See id.; see also Eric Dash & 
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Government Seizes WaMu and Sells Some Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/business/26wamu.html?_r=1. 
167 Evans, supra note 165.  The FDIC requires insurance premiums at approximately one percent 
of all deposits.  This is a relatively small percentage.  Exacerbating this disparity in insurance liability 
versus reserve insurance capital, Congress recently passed a bill that temporarily increased insured 
bank accounts from $100,000 to $250,000.  Congress increased coverage to reassure 
investors/depositors and encourage depositors to leave excess funds in the banks to keep banks 
capitalized.  However, as a result of the FDIC’s fast depleting funds, they are considering increasing 
the one percent premium, which would potentially counteract Congress’ efforts to capitalize banks at a 
critical economic time. 
168 MICA FACTBOOK, supra note 29, at 14. 
169 Who is the FDIC?, supra note 164. 
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either direct or indirect regulation.170  Whether a direct or indirect 
regulator, the FMIC would be a central regulation entity and set the 
standards for underwriting, capitalization, consumer education, back end 
fees, broker education, and subprime fees—prerequisites to qualifying for 
insurance coverage. 
Thus, one of the most important roles of the FMIC would be to provide 
an efficient, consistent, and uniform source of loan regulation in an age 
when loan packages are evolving daily.  During the past decade, nearly 
every major regulatory body in the federal government, that has anything 
to do with mortgages, has publicly acknowledged the need for major 
mortgage regulation reform.171  The following sections outline a few new 
regulatory schemes that the FMIC could implement in an effort to stabilize 
and strengthen the mortgage industry and, ultimately, the national 
economy.  Some of these changes are large scale, and some would be very 
specific and detailed.172 
1.  FMIC and a Dual Lending System 
With the creation of the FMIC, Congress could consider the possibility 
of a “dual lender system” to mirror the “dual banking system.”  For 
decades, the banking system has operated with some banks regulated by 
state governments and others by the federal government.  Similarly, 
lenders—like banks—could operate under the same model and decide 
whether to be regulated and insured under federal or state laws.  At first 
glance, this concept may appear to undermine this Notes’s thesis which 
calls for developing a centralized federal mortgage entity.  But, if the 
federal FMIC program offered sufficient incentives, the country could 
potentially arrive at the same end (centralized regulatory regime) having 
imposed significantly less coercive means (“incentives” for participation 
instead of “compulsory” adherence).  In other words, just as most major 
banks have gravitated toward the federal protection and regulation offered 
by the FDIC, so might mortgage lending institutions gravitate toward the 
                                                                                                                          
170 The FMIC regulation practices could be roughly modeled after the FDIC, which is an indirect 
regulator of financial institutions.  In other words, while the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
is the official regulator of banking institutions, the FDIC imposes the minimum capitalization 
requirements that most often force banks into receivership.  Alternatively, the FHA—under the 
Housing Urban Development—provides its own lending standards and is an example of a direct 
regulator of loans processed under its insurance policies. 
171 Peterson, supra note 94, at 5 (discussing the several federal agencies that have publicly called 
for further lending regulation, including the Fed’s Board of Governors, HUD, FTC, OCC, FHFB, OTS, 
NCUA, OFHEO, FDIC, GAO, and the DOJ). 
172 Rather than give a long list of possible regulatory concepts that could be implemented with the 
advent of the FMIC, this section provides a few concepts that could be implemented by the new entity.  
In each subsection, I have attempted to provide a short discussion of why the proposed change in 
regulation would be useful, as well as how it would work.  There are dozens more regulatory ideas that 
could (and perhaps should) be added, but I have included just a few specific proposals to start (or 
perpetuate) the national regulatory reform conversation. 
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same benefits offered by the FMIC.  A glaring difference between the two 
industries (banking and mortgage) that could potentially stifle the 
movement of lenders from state to federal governance, is that unlike the 
FDIC, consumers would not directly benefit from the FMIC insurance 
coverage.  Thus, consumers would potentially apply less pressure on 
lending institutions to register with the FMIC in order to receive federal 
insurance coverage.  But this shortfall is not conclusive because investors 
would play a significant role in the decision. 
Lending institutions would potentially receive a great deal of pressure 
from investors concerned with the stability of mortgage backed securities 
and stocks.  Additionally, Congress could pass legislation requiring 
lending institutions to insure at least fifty percent of all loan products.  
These two factors would provide incentive to lending institutions to 
consider the federal FMIC insurance and governance, and would 
simultaneously coerce reform in the private mortgage insurance industry to 
provide insurance products that extend fifty percent coverage. 
Notably, the FDIC boasts that it is, “the primary federal regulator of 
banks that are chartered by the states that do not join the Federal Reserve 
System.”173  This fact may suggest that were the country to adopt a dual 
lending system, state-lending institutions may prefer to adhere to the 
federal regulations imposed by the FMIC—whether or not the institution 
participated in the federal insurance program. 
The appeal of a dual lending system is that it could be the only way to 
appease those who may oppose the creation of the FMIC as a complete 
reformation of the mortgage lending industry under federal jurisdiction.174  
Under a dual lending system, the FMIC would provide incentives for 
mortgage lenders to adhere to centralized federal mortgage laws, become 
sufficiently insured, and stabilize capital without jeopardizing federalism 
or forcing nationwide adherence to a new regulatory regime.175 
2.  FMIC Required Disclosure of Yield Spreads 
Through TILA, the Real Estate Settlement Act, and HOEPA, Congress 
has successfully required increased lender disclosure and borrower 
understanding.176  But, in the case of yield spreads, these regulations fall 
short of their intended purpose. 
When the average consumer meets with a mortgage lender to begin the 
                                                                                                                          
173 Who is the FDIC?, supra note 164. 
174 See supra Parts II.C., III.B. (discussing the opposing viewpoints concerning mortgage reform). 
175 This “dual lending” regulatory regime is strictly an idea to help catalyze negotiation between 
opposing political viewpoints: those who are calling for a large-scale federal solution and those who 
prefer state sovereignty and institutional independence.  That said, while the proposal for two systems 
of regulation may help increase the widespread attractiveness of the proposal, it is not likely the most 
efficient method. 
176 See supra Part III.A. (discussing TILA, the Real Estate Settlement Act, and HOEPA). 
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loan process, the borrower is often barraged with many intricate details.  
Preliminary talks revolve around the consumer’s credit history, salary, 
length of employment, tax returns, and current debt-to-income status.  
Accordingly, most initial meetings with a lender turn out to be more of a 
“borrower interview” than a “mortgage lender interview.”  Those buyers 
who are not savvy in the process find the experience—wrought with heaps 
of paperwork, a steep learning curve, and incomprehensible legal and 
financial jargon—intimidating.  Among the most important parts of an 
initial meeting with a lender is the moment where the lender provides the 
“rate quote.”  Differing brokers will regularly quote varying rates 
according to the buyer’s credit, job, and payment history.  Unbeknownst to 
non-savvy borrowers, the rate quote is arguably the most important 
distinction between lenders and is a primary purpose of “interviewing 
lenders.”  Many consumers believe the mortgage broker’s job is simply to 
quote the lowest rate for which the consumer can qualify.  Many 
consumers assume that the rates are set solely by the Fed and that banks 
and mortgage brokers lend to similar buyers at the same rates—which is 
not true.  There are many competing forces at play when the mortgage 
broker quotes a rate to a potential borrower.  First, lenders have incentive 
to quote low rates in order to win borrower trust.  But, lenders are usually 
also given incentives via lender “yield spreads,” which provide kickbacks 
to mortgage brokers for quoting rates higher than the rate for which the 
buyer is qualified.  In other words, a yield spread is essentially a fee paid 
by the lender to the mortgage broker for quoting an interest rate that 
exceeds the interest rate for which the buyer is qualified. 
Defenders of the yield spread claim that the fee is of no concern to the 
consumer because the lender pays the back end fee.  Critics claim that the 
consumer pays for the fee over the course of the loan and therefore 
deserves full disclosure. 
Two minor requirements could drastically alter the yield spread 
controversy.  First, the FMIC could require lenders to provide full 
disclosure by providing rate sheets for the borrower to sign.  These rate 
sheets would simply show the consumer the established rate, the rate the 
consumer qualified for, and the rate the mortgage broker offered the 
consumer.  Second, the FMIC could require a “fee disclosure sheet” that 
would disclose the fee being paid to the mortgage broker and the amount 
the borrower will pay over the life of the loan as a result of the increase in 
rate.  When full disclosure of a fee will largely eliminate the fee, there is 
little question about whether the fee should be legal or not. 
3.  FMIC Required Consumer Education 
Bolstering the proposal to require mortgage brokers to provide 
meaningful disclosure about fees, but reaching more broadly, the FMIC 
could require that an informational program accompany each loan that 
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exceeded a fifty percent LTV ratio.  This process could be completed 
either by paper or electronically.  Currently, many colleges and universities 
across the country require students to complete online tutorials in order to 
access student loans.  These tutorials increase awareness about fees, loan 
restrictions, prepayment penalties, balloon payments, late charges, and 
interest rates.  Specific to mortgages, a program or paper tutorial required 
by the FMIC could explain simple nuances that relate to the consumer’s 
type of loan, including: types of amortization, risks of reverse 
amortization, risks of no-interest loans, fees accompanying refinancing, 
and consequences of adjustable rate mortgages. 
4.  FMIC Required Suitability Standards 
Requiring suitability standards within the mortgage lending market 
means to require mortgage brokers to ensure that loans are suitable for the 
circumstances of the borrowers that receive them.177  Generally, suitability 
doctrines are associated with stockbrokers; but, more recently, suitability 
requirements have been applied in the insurance industry.  Some scholars 
argue that the insurance industry’s recent adoption of the suitability 
requirement provides impetus for suitability in the mortgage industry.178  
One of the major concerns with imposing suitability requirements in the 
lending industry is that since brokers work for lenders, they cannot 
simultaneously represent the borrower.  In this way, critics claim that 
mortgage broker allegiance to the lender (employer) creates a conflict of 
interest.  Conversely, those who support extending the suitability doctrine 
counter that seventy percent of loans are extended by mortgage brokers 
who have a stark negotiating advantage over their clients and a financial 
incentive to dupe their clients.179 
Additionally, some state regulators have already begun requiring 
pseudo-suitability requirements through creative regulation.  For example, 
if a regulator perceives that a loan was not suitable for a client then some 
                                                                                                                          
177 Frank A. Hirsch, Jr., The Evolution of a Suitability Standard in the Mortgage Lending 
Industry: The Subprime Meltdown Fuels the Fires of Change, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 21, 21–22 
(2008). 
178 Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of 
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1331–35 (2002) (describing the evolution of the insurance 
industry to adopt the suitability requirement beginning with the Anderson v. Knox decision in 1961 
through a period where several states adopted the doctrine:  Finally, the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioner (“NAIC”) recommended that “all states adopt a suitability requirement for the 
sale of life insurance and annuity products.”  The SEC justified adopting the suitability doctrine 
because “disclosure does not provide adequate protection to investors. In the seminal case of Phillips & 
Co., the SEC imposed a suitability requirement because ‘disclosure requirements and practices alone 
had not been wholly effective in protecting the investor.’”). 
179 Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Sometimes Less is More: Utility, Preemption, and Hermeneutical 
Criticisms of Proposed Federal Regulation of Mortgage Brokers, 59 S.C. L. REV. 61, 63 (2007) (noting 
that mortgage brokers originate approximately seventy percent of all residential mortgage loans, have 
unique access to borrowers and incentive to extract high fees, and have been identified as primary 
participants in predatory lending). 
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regulators make the theoretical jump to assert that the same loan 
undermines the lending system and is therefore illegal.  “Historically, 
absent special mitigating circumstances, lenders do not even owe 
borrowers the duty of care to avoid negligence in the lending process, 
although some regulators take a contrary position based upon their primary 
goal to ensure safety and soundness to the banking system.”180 
As a result, some states have begun gravitating toward actually 
requiring suitability standards of mortgage lenders.181  For example, a 
recently enacted statute in Maine imposes suitability requirements that 
hold the mortgage broker responsible for (1) determining whether the 
borrower is able to make the scheduled payments during the course of the 
loan and (2) verifying employment, income, and credit.182  Similarly, the 
FMIC could reasonably require that mortgage brokers accept suitability 
requirements in exchange for insurance on the loans they write. 
5.  FMIC Required Securitization Standards 
The FMIC could also provide standards and information regarding the 
securitization of the products it insures.  For several years, scholars have 
opined that by regulating home loan securitization standards, the federal 
government could effectively stifle funds that support the subprime 
mortgage problem.183  During the last decade, securitization was a 
precipitating factor because it facilitated the renewing of funds for 
predatory loans by way of investment.184  The problem was that Wall 
Street firms securitized home loans without regard to either the fairness or 
the quality of the loan.185  Several negative externalities derive from 
unregulated home loan securitization.  First, securitization of subprime 
loans often provides funds for small lenders who are statistically more 
likely to participate in loan abuses because they are not heavily 
regulated.186  Second, negligent securitization provides incentives to 
lenders and mortgage brokers to continue unfair loan practices by 
providing a secondary market for them to shift their risk.187 Third, 
investors’ demands for higher returns on subprime loans encourage lenders 
to gouge subprime borrowers.188 
To date, it remains unclear whether this is a mortgage industry 
                                                                                                                          
180 Hirsch, supra note 177, at 22–23. 
181 Id. at 25. 
182 Id. at 31. 
183 Engel & McCoy, supra note 19, at 2039–40. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 2040–41; SHILLER, SUBPRIME SOLUTION, supra note 21, at 136 (discussing the difficulty 
of evaluating the risk of securities and the unscrupulous mortgage originators that were allowed to lend 
to borrowers that were likely to default). 
186 Id. at 2041. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
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problem or an SEC problem.  The FMIC could at least provide guidelines 
by which loan products are created and require a heightened standard for 
all products that are resold to the secondary market. 
6.  FMIC Required Down Payment and Elimination of Gold Accounts 
In the distant past, most lenders required a down payment before 
approving a borrower to qualify for a loan.  This down payment served as 
proof of the buyer’s commitment to the purchase, and his or her ability to 
save up for the investment; it also mitigated the lender’s risk.  Most lenders 
required the money to come from the borrower’s own bank account, which 
forced the borrower to show a savings history over several months.  In 
other words, most lenders prevented borrowers from using gifts, grants, or 
friends to provide the down payment on real property. 
Recently, the FHA and VA programs have insured loans that require 
three percent down payments.  Compared to other loans, this is a relatively 
small amount.  Even more surprising, these specialized government loan 
programs allow buyers to borrow and receive gifts to pay the down 
payment.  In fact, the “gift” need not come from a family member or 
friend, it can come from the seller.  In such transactions, the seller 
“donates” the three percent down payment to a “Gold Account” and the 
down payment is paid to the buyer’s mortgage lender from the Gold 
Account. 
There are several problems with the current government-sponsored 
down payment program.  First, the program creates incentive to buyers, 
sellers, lenders, and appraisers to commit “white-lie loan fraud.”  For 
example, suppose a desperate-to-sell homeowner markets his or her 
$350,000 home for a six month period.  Further, suppose that the 
homeowner meets an equally desperate buyer that has longed to buy a 
home, but does not earn enough to save a sufficient down payment.  The 
buyer and seller find a “win win solution” wherein both get what they want 
at the expense of societal externalities.  The buyer offers the seller 
$375,000 for the home (well above the value and asking price of the house) 
and the seller agrees to pay the buyer’s closing costs and the buyer’s down 
payment.189  The buyer gets the house of his dreams without paying a 
dollar out of pocket and the seller gets full price for the house—even after 
paying the buyer’s requests.  At first glance, only one entity loses, the 
lender; but in the case of federal loans (FHA) and loans packaged and sold 
to federal entities (Ginnie Mae), the lender is actually the American 
                                                                                                                          
189 This transaction is considered loan fraud in most states and by most lenders, unless the seller’s 
contribution passes through a federally approved seller contribution plan available only in dealing with 
FHA (i.e., government) loans.  Although, notably, there are many legal products offered by lenders, 
which allow borrowers one-hundred percent financing: eighty-twenty loans, ninety-ten loans, and one 
hundred percent loans. 
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taxpayer.  Additionally, the higher sale price on the home inflates 
neighborhood prices and triggers a housing bubble.  The problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that, if the buyer cannot make his payments (either 
because his ARM begins to increase, or he loses his job), he will not likely 
be able to find a buyer at the inflated $375,000 price range—particularly in 
the 2008–09 market where real estate bubbles have collapsed.  Thus, in 
addition to providing insurance, the FMIC could provide thresholds for 
acceptable loan products and appropriate down payments.190 
7.  FMIC Required Foreclosure Practice 
During 2008 and 2009, millions of houses ended up in the queue for 
foreclosure.  While each state deals with foreclosure differently, and each 
lender has different foreclosure policies and procedures, a few ineffective 
practices occur throughout the country.  The FMIC could require lenders to 
participate in programs designed to waylay foreclosures—or even 
streamline foreclosures—in order to curb insurance claims for foreclosure 
losses and stabilize our country’s volatile real estate market. 
Foreclosures are caused by a myriad of reasons, but all of the reasons 
start with a homeowner’s desire to sell.  Several circumstances force 
homeowners to sell: lost jobs, employment relocation, adjustable rate 
mortgage rate changes, divorce, college, etc.  When someone is forced to 
sell and cannot find a buyer to pay the amount owed on the house, the 
person is forced into foreclosure.  Sometimes, in the case of a short sale, a 
distressed seller can appeal to the mortgage lender to accept a buyer’s offer 
for a percentage of the loan amount, regardless of the fact that the seller 
owes more than the purchase price.  If the home cannot be sold through 
normal means, and it cannot be “short-sold,” then the bank must foreclose 
on the property.  Approximately ninety days later the bank will usually 
attempt to sell the home at foreclosure sale for a decreased price to 
investors.  If the home does not sell for cash it becomes a bank owned 
property and the bank either holds the property in its portfolio or unloads 
the property to other investors for a nominal price. 
These steps to foreclosure—and beyond—have become commonplace 
                                                                                                                          
190 For example, the FMIC could require five percent—to pick an arbitrary number—that would 
at least provide some threshold safeguard against the systemic externalities precipitated by both mass 
loan manipulation and lender's incessant desire to create increasingly risky loan products in order to 
achieve short term personal gains.  Also, it is notable that after the initial writing of this Note the 
government has suspended the seller contribution program; however not apparently due to societal 
externalities but because of cost of foreclosure.  Shaun Donovan, Remarks at the 6th Annual Housing 
Policy Council Meeting (May 7, 2009) available at http://www.hud.gov/news/speeches/2009-05-
07.cfm (“Note that at the beginning of the current fiscal year, seller funded down payment assistance 
loans accounted for 14 percent of all FHA loans outstanding, but generated 31 percent of all FHA 
foreclosures and 31 percent of all losses on foreclosed-properties.  Looking forward, we estimate that 
without the elimination of this program, FHA would have needed an FY 2010 appropriation of over 
$2.5 billion.  Instead, we project that FHA will return to the tax payer over $1.7 billion.”) 
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in our lending system because they represent the path of least resistance for 
banks.  However, if the government were to provide insurance, the 
insurance entity could do more than just hedge against bank losses; it could 
set the standard for bank actions that must be performed before issuing the 
insurance claim.  A different set of “foreclosure practices,” sculpted by the 
government, could favor the entire economy.  A few examples of possible 
reform within the foreclosure structure, that could potentially help the 
market from entering a negative feedback loop, are provided below. 
First, the FMIC could require the bank to accept certain short sale 
offers when a distressed seller has appropriately proven that foreclosure 
will inevitably ensue.  In many states, bank short sales are ineffective and 
the process is inefficient.  Short sales often fail and banks stubbornly push 
on to foreclosure because it is an easier event to explain to bank 
investors.191  Meanwhile, payments continue to go unpaid, the property 
deteriorates, and often the market continues to soften.  By forcing the bank 
to cooperate early in the foreclosure process (short sales), the FMIC could 
effectively eliminate a large number of foreclosures and mitigate industry 
losses. 
Second, the FMIC could require banks to provide a forty-five-day 
grace period for qualified buyers who wish to bid at foreclosure auctions.  
Currently many jurisdictions require investors to pay cash within twenty-
four hours of the foreclosure auction.  The “here and now” mentality of 
banks effectively precludes the general public from participating in the 
foreclosure process.  Investors that search for properties at forty, fifty, and 
sixty cents on the dollar pull down the bank’s ability to recoup debt, drop 
the value of foreclosed real estate, and simultaneously harm the resale 
market.  The FMIC could revolutionize the foreclosure market by allowing 
a forty-five day window to qualified buyers who provide $10,000 in non-
refundable earnest money to close on a foreclosure property.  Additionally, 
the process fails to draw on the buying power of the entire market.  Many 
of the nation’s state foreclosure systems extract homes from those who are 
poor and then open the bidding process only to those who are rich and have 
hundreds of thousands of dollars of cash to invest. 
These FMIC requirements could decrease the number of homes pushed 
into foreclosure every year and decrease the crippling effect foreclosures 
                                                                                                                          
191 In a typical short sale, the bank must receive sufficient documentation to show that the seller is 
truly “distressed” in order to appease management and investors.  This requirement is only the first of 
the hurdles.  Perhaps the largest complication is that often the broker price opinion (an inexpensive 
bank appraisal) is higher than a deflated market will support (partly because the appraisal is often based 
on comparable sales during past months).  Thus, legitimate short sale offers are often rejected by 
lending institutions.  On the other hand, when a property is foreclosed, the bank and investors in the 
bank expect less from the property and are more willing to cut their losses.  But the problem remains 
that the market for foreclosed properties is significantly smaller and more picky.  Thus, forcing banks 
into short selling at reasonable losses would be better for the lender, seller, buyer, and, ultimately, the 
market as a whole. 
 2009] ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL MORTGAGE REFORM 363 
have on the market. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The FMIC proposal provides a strong foundational cornerstone for 
further discussion and illustrates a viable and workable solution that draws 
on major legal and economic principles—proven in other markets—that 
would most likely stabilize the mortgage market.  Granted, the program 
would be difficult to analyze before implementing.  Extensive deliberation, 
debate, and research would be required in order for Congress to fully 
analyze the effects that such a large-scale program would have on the 
market.  Fortunately, consideration could begin with detailed research on 
the similarly large-scale reformations that developed in the wake of the 
Great Depression: the SEC, FDIC, FHA, and the Fed.  Similar to the 
proposal for the FMIC, many of the past federal efforts to create 
centralized regulation and capitalization in various industries were spurred 
on by a looming market meltdown. 192 
While it is difficult to anticipate every effect the FMIC might have, 
some market reactions can be confidently anticipated.  For example, the 
FMIC insurance premium payments—paid either by consumers, lending 
institutions, or both—would undoubtedly slow lending in the mortgage 
market.  The effect of a slowed lending industry would in turn slow the 
housing market and perhaps cause a slight drop in market prices (because 
sellers would inevitably struggle to find qualified buyers).193  On the other 
hand, investor confidence would significantly increase and the demand for 
mortgage-backed securities—insured by a government entity—would 
likely create a counteracting influx of investor cash.194  The result would be 
an increase in the availability of loans, which would catalyze market 
growth.  Thus, even though insurance premiums may potentially slow 
market forces, investor confidence would likely counterbalance negative 
effects. 
Admittedly, there are other alternative solutions.  Each alternative 
solution—and each variation of the FMIC—would inevitably be 
accompanied by positive and negative effects and repercussions.  But, the 
FMIC does represent a more thorough and long-term solution than is 
                                                                                                                          
192 The Fed was created in response to the frequent bank runs early in the century.  FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 35, at 76. 
193 This same cause and effect cycle is perhaps illustrated most notably by the 2008 housing 
market: (1) panic among banks slowed lending which slowed buying; (2) slowed buying required 
sellers to lower prices; (3) lower prices devalued bank collateral on issued loans; and (4) deflating bank 
assets undermined the stability of lending institutions at the very point when foreclosures began to 
increase. 
194 Investor response would likely increase because even though the government was “partly” 
involved in mortgages before, the relationship between the government and secondary market lenders 
Fannie and Freddie—“government sponsored entities”—was always too ambiguous for full investor 
confidence. 
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currently before Congress.  In other words, it is a solution that exceeds the 
recent knee-jerk reactions of Congress to simply avoid recession, avoid 
contagion, and avoid depression.  The United States deserves a long-term 
solution that the FMIC could provide.195 
The FMIC solution thoroughly weighs many of the most important 
mortgage industry shortcomings and provides workable answers that place 
the burden of capital reserves on the industry—not the taxpayer.  The 
FMIC addresses the most fundamental—and incidentally the most 
difficult—problems within the mortgage lending legal system: insufficient 
capital reserves, decentralized regulation, inconsistent state standards, 
slipshod disclosure, inadequate consumer education, and taxpayer 
insurance.  For these reasons, the time has come to seriously consider 
implementing large-scale reform to provide long-term solutions for the 
mortgage industry. 
                                                                                                                          
195 The FMIC solution is more reliable than the haphazard bailout of the mortgage industry with 
taxpayer capital.  It is more comprehensive than the current sporadic state efforts to patch up an 
insufficient predatory regime.  And it avoids creating greater systemic risk by morphing bankrupted 
financial entities that are “too big to fail” into even bigger companies. 
